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MEASURING A “SPIRITUAL STAKE”: HOW TO
DETERMINE INJURY-IN-FACT IN CHALLENGES
TO PUBLIC DISPLAYS OF RELIGION
Ashley C. Robson*
This Note analyzes the unique standing problem introduced by a
particular set of Establishment Clause cases:
those concerning
nontaxpayer-based challenges to alleged “public displays” of religious
symbols. This injury-in-fact problem arises due to the nature of the specific
type of harm recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court in the context of
religious displays: the public endorsement of religion. Due to this
unusually subjective harm, it is unclear how the courts should evaluate this
threshold injury-in-fact inquiry. This Note analyzes the legal conflict
arising from the attempt to remain faithful to both the traditional injury-infact standing requirements and the endorsement test generally applied to
the merits in Establishment Clause challenges. This Note interprets
Supreme Court precedent and proposes a tailored, multifactor test,
articulating a specific injury-in-fact burden for public display challengers.
The proposed test attempts to take into account the entirety of the unique
injury. In particular, this test considers the display in context, rather than
as a mere “snapshot.” This standard, while unique, is fully reconcilable
with the Court’s current standing jurisprudence and addresses the various
policy implications confronted by the lower courts.
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INTRODUCTION
Imagine a tourist, who happens to be an atheist, enters the National
September 11 Memorial and Museum, and is shocked to see a seventeenfoot-tall cross, formed by the steel beams of the World Trade Center.1 To
her, the structure is a physical reminder of her inferior political and social
status as a nonbeliever. She feels stigmatized, not by her fellow citizens,
but by the government. This citizen looks to the federal court system to
rectify what she believes to be a violation of her protected interest in being
free from public displays of religion. However, a district court might
dismiss her case because the federal system does not recognize this type of
spiritual injury.
The cross-shaped steel beam recovered from the World Trade Center site
after the September 11, 2001 attacks has gained substantial notoriety.2
1. This hypothetical is based on recent litigation. See Am. Atheists, Inc. v. Port Auth.
of N.Y. & N.J., No. 11 Civ 6026 (S.D.N.Y. dismissed Mar. 28, 2013).
2. See Sally Jenkins, A Long-Standing Message of Loss and Hope, WASH. POST, Sept.
9, 2011, at A1.
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American Atheists, Inc. challenged the proposed display at the Memorial as
a violation of the U.S. Constitution under the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment.3 While this particular challenge has received national
attention,4 challenges to religious displays throughout the country similarly
stir up controversy on the local level.5
To gain access to the federal court system, plaintiffs must first prove that
they have Article III standing to bring suit.6 A main component of this
showing requires a plaintiff to allege a sufficient injury to a protected
interest—a specific and personal “injury-in-fact.”7 This Note analyzes the
unique standing problem introduced by a particular set of Establishment
Clause cases: those concerning nontaxpayer-based challenges8 to alleged
“public displays” of religious symbols.9 This injury-in-fact problem arises
due to the nature of the specific type of harm recognized by the Supreme
Court in the context of religious displays: the public endorsement of
religion.10 The harm caused by the perceived endorsement of religion is an
unusual type of harm, one that sends “a message to nonadherents that they
are outsiders, [and] not full members of the political community.”11 Due to
this unusually subjective harm, it is unclear how the courts should evaluate
this threshold injury-in-fact inquiry.12
Access to the federal courts has long been recognized as a fundamental
right of all U.S. citizens.13 However, if the plaintiff has failed to establish
Article III standing, then the case will be dismissed and the plaintiff may be
left without an available alternative recourse.14 Specifically, this Note
examines the different injury-in-fact standards15 adopted by the various

3. Notice of Removal at 4–5, Am. Atheists, Inc., No. 11 Civ 6026 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26,
2011), 2011 WL 3791873; see also U.S. CONST., amend. I.
4. See, e.g., Elissa Gootman, Atheists Sue To Block Display of Cross-Shaped Trade
Center Beam in 9/11 Museum, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2011, at A20.
5. See, e.g., Manny Fernandez, In Texas, a Legal Battle Over Biblical Banners, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 22, 2012, at A13 (discussing the community’s reaction to a school district’s
decision to ban the cheerleaders from putting Bible verses on banners at football games);
Martha Groves & Jessica Garrison, Nativity Scene Ban: “The Atheists Won on This,” L.A.
TIMES (Nov. 19, 2012, 4:36 PM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2012/11/nativityscene-ban-the-atheists-won-on-this.html (discussing public reaction to a district court’s
decision to ban nativity and other seasonal displays in public spaces).
6. See infra Part I.A for a general discussion of federal standing doctrine.
7. See infra Part I.A.2 for a general discussion of this requisite injury.
8. See infra note 202 for a description of “nontaxpayer” standing.
9. See infra note 198 for a description of “public display” of religious symbols.
10. See infra Part I.B.2 for a discussion of the prevailing merits test applied in the
Establishment Clause context: the endorsement test.
11. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring). See
generally infra Part I.B.
12. See infra Part II for the current standing jurisprudence in the public display of
religious symbols context.
13. See infra note 24 and accompanying text for a discussion of this fundamental right.
14. See infra Part III.B for an analysis of the policy implications of denying standing.
15. See infra Part I.A for a discussion of constitutional requirements and prudential
limitations concerning Article III–conferring injury-in-fact.
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circuits when evaluating standing in these cases.16 The circuits impose
different burdens on the plaintiff to prove injury-in-fact, varying from
requiring evidence that the plaintiff “altered” his or her behavior as a result
of the display,17 to merely requiring some form of “direct and unwelcome
contact” with the display.18
These different approaches are especially problematic because they
appear to conflict with prevailing Supreme Court precedent.19 While
circuits have taken a more liberal approach to standing in these cases,20 the
Supreme Court’s approach to standing generally is arguably becoming more
restrictive.21
This Note analyzes the legal conflict arising from attempts to remain
faithful to both the traditional injury-in-fact standing requirements and the
endorsement test generally applied to the merits in Establishment Clause
challenges.22 Former Chief Justice William Rehnquist, with whom Justice
Antonin Scalia and Justice Clarence Thomas joined, acknowledged the
conflict, noting that the issue was of particular importance as its resolution

16. See infra Part II.B.
17. See, e.g., Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Zielke, 845 F.2d 1463, 1467–68
(7th Cir. 1988). See generally infra Part II.B.2.
18. See, e.g., Suhre v. Haywood Cnty., 131 F.3d 1083, 1088 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding
that only direct contact is required because the altered behavior standard is “contrived” and
would only serve to further alienate plaintiffs). See generally infra Part II.B.1.
19. See infra Parts II.A and III.A for analysis of the competing interpretations of the
Supreme Court precedent.
20. It is important to note that the Supreme Court has not conducted a standing inquiry
in a public display case.
21. See infra notes 66, 98, 138–42 and accompanying text.
22. It has been argued that this tension requires the Court to adopt a restrictive approach
to standing, essentially repudiating the various circuit approaches. See, e.g., David Harvey,
Comment, It’s Time To Make Non-economic or Citizen Standing Take a Seat in “Religious
Display” Cases, 40 DUQ. L. REV. 313, 371 (2002) (“[A]bsent any allegations that plaintiffs
have truly suffered some type of palpable injury from the plaque, reliance upon the political
process, not the courts, is not only proper; it is totally consistent with our form of
government.”); David Spencer, Note, What’s the Harm? Nontaxpayer Standing To
Challenge Religious Symbols, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1071, 1097 (2011) (“[T]he
Supreme Court should intervene and reaffirm that offense and stigma are not sufficiently
concrete and particularized injuries to give rise to standing.”). However, this Note argues
that this restrictive interpretation relies on a flawed interpretation of language used by Justice
Rehnquist in Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church
& State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982). See infra notes 171–72 and accompanying text for
examples of this flawed interpretation by courts and scholars alike and infra Part III.A for an
interpretation of the relevant precedent. Cf. Marc Rohr, Tilting at Crosses: Nontaxpayer
Standing To Sue Under the Establishment Clause, 11 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 495, 529–30 (1995)
(“Plaintiffs who assert that they are offended by governmental sponsorship of religious
symbols to which they have been, and will be again, personally exposed suffer more
concrete personal injuries than the geographically remote, ideologically driven plaintiffs in
Valley Forge.”). For another alternative proposal concerning standing in these cases, see
John M. Bickers, Standing on Holy Ground: How Rethinking Justiciability Might Bring
Peace to the Establishment Clause, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 415 (2012) (suggesting that “the
Supreme Court . . . replace the current standing chaos with a limit to claims against current
government activity”).
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would help to define the proper scope of the federal power of judicial
review of state actions.23
In Part I, this Note introduces the general doctrine of standing and then
documents the evolution of Supreme Court precedent concerning the
Establishment Clause as it relates to challenges to perceived governmental
endorsement of religion. Part II focuses on the legal conflict concerning
standing in public display cases and analyzes both Supreme Court
precedent and the various circuit court approaches. Part III interprets the
Supreme Court precedent and proposes a tailored, multifactor test,
articulating a specific injury-in-fact burden for public display challengers.
The proposed test attempts to take into account the entirety of the unique
injury. In particular, this test considers the display in context, rather than as
a mere “snapshot.” This standard, while unique, is fully reconcilable with
the Court’s current standing jurisprudence and addresses the various policy
implications confronted by the lower courts.
I. FEDERAL COURT STANDING AND THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE:
AN OVERVIEW OF SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT
Two constitutional sources provide the definition of what constitutes the
requisite injury-in-fact to confer Article III standing for a plaintiff
challenging the public display of religion: (1) Article III’s “cases” or
“controversies” language and (2) the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment. Part I.A first introduces the basic requirements of and the
purpose behind the Court’s standing jurisprudence. Then, Part I.B
discusses the various aspects of litigating alleged violations of the
Establishment Clause.
A. Federal Court Standing
Access to the federal courts has long been recognized as a fundamental
right of all U.S. citizens.24 However, the standing inquiry functions as a

23. City of Edmond v. Robinson, 517 U.S. 1201, 1202 (1996) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting in the denial of certiorari) (discussing the split concerning “whether Valley Forge
allowed standing to a plaintiff alleging direct injury by being exposed to a state symbol that
offends his beliefs”); see also ACLU Neb. Found. v. City of Plattsmouth, 358 F.3d 1020,
1028 (8th Cir. 2004) (“No governing precedent describes the injury in fact required to
establish standing in a religious display case such as this.”), vacated on reh’g en banc, 419
F.3d 772 (8th Cir. 2005).
24. See, e.g., Chambers v. Balt. & Ohio R.R., 207 U.S. 142, 148 (1907) (“In an
organized society [the right to sue and defend in the courts] is the right conservative of all
other rights, and lies at the foundation of orderly government. It is one of the highest and
most essential privileges of citizenship . . . .”); cf. Jonathan H. Adler, God, Gaia, the
Taxpayer, and the Lorax: Standing, Justiciability, and Separation of Powers After
Massachusetts and Hein, 20 REGENT U. L. REV. 175, 197 (2008) (arguing that “the urgency
of environmental concerns or the importance of the Establishment Clause do not justify
transgressing the traditional bounds of Article III”).
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threshold burden, restricting access into this judicial system.25 First, this
Note provides an overview of the Court’s standing doctrine. Next, this
Note analyzes a specific aspect of standing: the injury-in-fact requirement.
Lastly, this Note focuses on the particular type of noneconomic injury at
issue in public display challenges.
1. Overview of Standing Requirements and the Purpose of Standing
Both constitutional requirements and judicially imposed prudential
considerations control access to the federal courts.26 In order to confer
Article III standing and invoke federal jurisdiction, the Supreme Court has
interpreted Article III’s “cases” or “controversies” language27 to require
that a plaintiff assert a (1) “personal injury” that is (2) “fairly traceable to
the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct” and (3) “likely to be redressed”
by the relief requested.28
The Court has also articulated a set of self-imposed limits, also known as
prudential considerations.29 These limits include, but are not limited to,30
the bar against asserting a third party’s rights, the requirement that a
plaintiff’s injury fall within the zone of interests protected by the law
invoked, and the rule that prohibits the judiciary from adjudicating claims
asserting generalized grievances31 that are more appropriately resolved by
the political branches.32 While these limits are arguably more flexible than

25. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992) (noting that
standing is not a “mere pleading requirement[] but rather an indispensable part of the
plaintiff’s case”).
26. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984) (stating that the various justiciability
doctrines relate “to an idea, which is more than an intuition but less than a rigorous and
explicit theory, about the constitutional and prudential limits to the powers of an unelected,
unrepresentative judiciary in our kind of government”).
27. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
28. Allen, 468 U.S. at 751 (citing Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for
Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982)). It is important to note that
standing doctrine concerns more than just ensuring a “proper plaintiff.” Although outside
the scope of this Note, the doctrine has also been crafted to determine a proper defendant.
See generally Matthew I. Hall, Standing of Intervenor-Defendants in Public Law Litigation,
80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1539 (2012) (discussing the standing issues in the pending challenges
to California’s Proposition 8 and the federal Defense of Marriage Act).
29. Allen, 468 U.S. at 751 (1984).
30. These limitations have not been “exhaustively defined.” Elk Grove Unified Sch.
Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 12 (2004).
31. However, one scholar has argued that the fact that a grievance is widely shared does
not ensure that the political branches will respond. Daniel J. Meltzer, Deterring
Constitutional Violations by Law Enforcement Officials: Plaintiffs and Defendants As
Private Attorneys General, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 247, 299 (1988).
32. Allen, 468 U.S. at 751.
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the immutable constitutional requirements,33 they still play an extensive
role in the Court’s standing jurisprudence.34
In satisfying both the constitutional and prudential standing requirements,
the plaintiff has a legal right to judicial intervention if the court determines
that enforcement of the asserted legal protection is warranted.35 In order to
satisfy this threshold burden, the plaintiff must plead and prove the
requirements with the same “manner and degree of evidence” as is
necessary to satisfy any other element of the claim.36
The Supreme Court has recognized that the standing inquiry is the most
important analysis in determining justiciability.37 The standing inquiry has
been justified as “a rough attempt” to ensure that only those individuals
who have a “direct stake in the outcome” bring suit.38 This personal stake
is thought to enhance the adversarial process39 and prevent the adjudication
of certain issues that are better left to the political process.40 Thus, this
barrier not only functions to further the practical necessities of adjudication
by guaranteeing that the challenger is a proper plaintiff41 but also helps to
define the proper role of the federal judiciary.42
33. John C. Yang, Standing . . . In the Doorway of Justice, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1356,
1387 (1991). For example, these prudential limitations, unlike their constitutional
counterparts, may be overcome by express congressional authorization. See Bennett v.
Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997).
34. David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 545 (1985)
(referring to these discretionary prudential requirements as “pervasive”).
35. See William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 229 (1988)
(framing the “essence” of the standing question in this manner).
36. Bennett, 520 U.S. at 167–68 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,
561 (1992)).
37. Allen, 468 U.S. at 750; see also Yang, supra note 33, at 1386–87 (noting that the
“larger question of justiciability” includes the standing, mootness, ripeness, finality, and
exhaustion doctrines).
38. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 740 (1972); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101
(1968).
39. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962) (noting that “concrete adverseness
. . . sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions”).
40. A main purpose behind standing is to further the separation of powers doctrine. See,
e.g., Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996) (stating that standing doctrine “prevents
courts of law from undertaking tasks assigned to the political branches”); Lujan v. Defenders
of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 569–60 (1992); Flast, 392 U.S. at 95; see also United States v.
Richardson 418 U.S. 166, 188 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring) (“The public confidence
essential to the [judiciary] and the vitality critical to the [representative branches] may well
erode if [the judiciary] do[es] not exercise self-restraint in the utilization of our power to
negative the actions of the other branches.”).
41. See sources cited supra note 38 and accompanying text for discussion of the
“personal stake” necessary to be deemed a “proper plaintiff.”
42. Although outside the scope of this Note, the proper role of the judiciary has long
been disputed. See, e.g., Ivan E. Bodensteiner, The Role of Federal Judges: Their Duty To
Enforce the Constitutional Rights of Individuals When the Other Branches of Government
Default, 18 VAL. U. L. REV. 1, 1 (1983) (“At least since Marbury v. Madison in 1803 the
proper role of the federal judiciary has been debated.”). A leading commentator has argued
that the Supreme Court initially crafted the standing doctrine into a discrete body of law “to
insulate progressive and New Deal legislation from frequent judicial attack.” Cass R.
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Due to these concerns, the Court has relied on standing to help ensure
that executive or legislative acts are only declared unconstitutional when
These
challenged by parties with sufficient interests at stake.43
considerations can even lead the Court to recognize a cognizable injury,
while simultaneously declining to exercise its judicial review over the
controversy.44 In determining whether a plaintiff has asserted a sufficient
interest in challenging government action, the Court must factor competing
concerns into its analysis. The Court often balances its role in protecting
individual liberty from the “excesses or oversights of democratic processes”
against its ability to gather the necessary information and make the
appropriate compromises.45 These competing considerations all inform
standing analysis, but the inquiry is not a “mechanical exercise.”46 In
particular, this standing inquiry becomes inevitably more complicated when
plaintiffs seek to protect intangible and noneconomic interests that are
politically controversial.47
2. Traditional Injury-in-Fact Analysis
This Note focuses on the injury-in-fact standing inquiry. The Supreme
Court has articulated three elements necessary to establish injury-in-fact.48
The injury must be (1) “an invasion of a legally protected interest”49 that is
(2) “concrete and particularized”50 and (3) “actual or imminent,” rather than
“‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’”51 This injury-in-fact inquiry is often the
Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III, 91
MICH. L. REV. 163, 179 (1992). But cf. Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Abusing Standing: A Comment
on Allen v. Wright, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 635 (1985) (arguing that the proper view of standing
is as a doctrine that focuses on the plaintiff’s stake in the outcome of the controversy, rather
than these separation of powers concerns).
43. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc.,
454 U.S. 464, 474 (1982) (citing Richardson, 418 U.S. at 188 (Powell, J., concurring)); Blair
v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 279 (1919).
44. See, e.g., Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 12–13 (2004)
(denying federal standing, citing a desire not to interfere with family relations, which are
typically structured by state law).
45. 13A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3531.4, at 176 (3d ed. 2008).
46. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).
47. See Frissell v. Rizzo, 597 F.2d 840, 845 (3d Cir. 1979) (noting that less tangible
injuries “will necessarily turn on a court’s view of the sensitivity of the constitutional values
in dispute”); see also 13A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 45, § 3531.4, at 174 (“If the competing
values asserted seem particularly sensitive, an injury that is thought slight may seem
insufficient to justify decision.”). See infra Part I.A.3 for a discussion of the heightened
scrutiny accorded to noneconomic injuries.
48. Sunstein, supra note 42, at 198–99.
49. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). See infra Part I.B.1 for a
discussion of the interests protected by the Establishment Clause.
50. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. The Lujan court noted that a “particularized” injury is one
which “affect[s] the plaintiff in a personal and individual way.” Id. at 560 n.1. See infra Part
I.A.3.a for a discussion of particularized injury-in-fact.
51. Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990) (citing City of L.A. v. Lyons, 461
U.S. 95, 101–02 (1983)). See infra Part I.A.3.b for a discussion of specific and imminent
injury-in-fact.

2013]

MEASURING A “SPIRITUAL STAKE”

2909

focus of the Court’s standing analysis.52 In practice, “injury” has evolved
into a term of art with a flexible meaning, making the concept, at times,
difficult to define.53
The Supreme Court has expressly recognized that the standing inquiry is
inextricably related to “the nature and source” of the claim.54 In Valley
Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and
State, Inc.,55 Justice Rehnquist acknowledged “that the concept [of
standing] cannot be reduced to a one-sentence or one-paragraph definition,”
as evidenced by the lack of consistency in its application.56 One scholar
has argued that, due to this inconsistency, the standing inquiry should be
focused on “the meaning of the specific statutory or constitutional provision
upon which the plaintiff relies rather than a disembodied and abstract
application of general principles of standing law.”57
However, this imprecision can lead to impermissibly conflating an
evaluation of the alleged injury with a determination of whether or not to
recognize the alleged interest injured.58 This conflation allows for the
incorporation of normative judgments into a purportedly objective
analysis.59 One scholar has noted that by “classifying some harms as
injuries in fact and other harms as purely ideological, courts must inevitably
rely on some standard that is normatively laden and independent of facts.”60

52. See Cone Corp. v. Fla. Dep’t of Transp., 921 F.2d 1190, 1204 (11th Cir. 1991),
(“Although each of these concepts [injury, causation, and redressability] may blend into the
others, the most important is the injury requirement.”).
53. See Frissell v. Rizzo, 597 F.2d 840, 845 (3d Cir. 1979) (“Injury in fact, after all, is
not mentioned in Art. III, and case or controversy is surely not a self-defining category.”);
13A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 45, § 3531.4, at 148.
54. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975). For example, a court may deny standing
to an individual who argues that an official has violated his right to privacy by conducting a
too-rigorous inspection of his packages while he was attempting to smuggle drugs.
13A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 45, § 3531.4, at 158 n.15.
55. 454 U.S. 464 (1982). See infra notes 169–74 and accompanying text for further
discussion of this case.
56. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 475.
57. Fletcher, supra note 35, at 239.
58. Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970) (“The
‘legal interest’ test goes to the merits. The question of standing is different.”); Dean v.
Blumenthal, 577 F.3d 60, 66 n.4 (2d Cir. 2009) (finding that the district court had
“erroneously conflated the requirement for an injury-in-fact with the constitutional validity
of [the plaintiff]’s claim” (citation omitted)).
59. See Wilderness Soc’y v. Kane Cnty., 581 F.3d 1198, 1212 (10th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he
phrase ‘legally protected interest’ provides ‘ample opportunity for mischief should a court be
bent on denying the reality of a sufficient injury-in-fact.’” (citation omitted)), vacated on
reh’g en banc, 632 F.3d 1162 (10th Cir. 2011); cf. Susan Bandes, The Idea of a Case, 42
STAN. L. REV. 227, 264 (1990) (“The factors relevant to the case determination exist on a
continuum, and the Court must unavoidably make choices about where on the continuum a
line should be drawn. . . . The Court must make distinctions of degree, not of kind.”).
60. Sunstein, supra note 42, at 188–89 (“But in every case, the person who brings a
lawsuit believes that she has indeed suffered an injury in fact. . . . When we deny these
claims, we are making a judgment based not on any fact, but instead on an inquiry into what
should count as a judicially cognizable injury.”).
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These concerns are rarely implicated in claims grounded on the alleged
infringement of a traditionally recognized property interest.61 For example,
when an individual is seeking damages as a remedy, the legal right “is often
assumed without discussion.”62 However, cognizable injuries are not
limited to these traditional interests.63
In the past, the Court recognized that the injury required to establish
standing was minimal,64 but this threshold has arguably been raised.65
Thus, some scholars have argued that as the injury-in-fact requirement has
been refined, it has also become more restrictive.66
3. Noneconomic Injury-in-Fact and Heightened Scrutiny
It is well established that standing may be grounded on noneconomic
injury.67 This Note focuses on the noneconomic harm associated with the
perceived endorsement of religion: when nonadherents feel relegated to
second-class citizenship.68 It has been accepted that noneconomic interests
61. Often, standing is not even addressed in judicial opinions. See 13A WRIGHT ET AL.,
supra note 45, § 3531.4, at 146–47.
62. Danvers Motor Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 432 F.3d 286, 293 (3d Cir. 2005) (“Monetary
harm is a classic form of injury-in-fact.” (citing Adams v. Watson, 10 F.3d 915, 920–25 &
n.13 (1st Cir. 1993))); cf. Schutz v. Thorne, 415 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 2005) (finding
that a higher hunting license fee charged to nonresidents as compared to residents was a
sufficient injury to a nonresident challenging the implementing statute).
63. See infra Part I.A.3 for further discussion of noneconomic interests.
64. For example, in United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency
Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669 (1973), the Court held that “a specific and perceptible
harm that distinguished [the plaintiffs] from other citizens” was sufficient injury at the
pleadings stage. Id. at 689 (emphasis added). The SCRAP Court rejected the government’s
argument that standing should be limited to those “significantly” affected by the challenged
actions. Id. at 689 n.14 (“‘Injury in fact’ . . . serves to distinguish a person with a direct stake
in the outcome of a litigation—even though small—from a person with a mere interest in the
problem.”). The Court went on to cite a scholarly work that argued that “an identifiable
trifle is enough for standing to fight out a question of principle; the trifle is the basis for
standing and the principle supplies the motivation.” Id. (citing Kenneth Culp Davis,
Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 601, 613 (1968)).
65. For example, in Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149 (1990), the Court distinguished
the SCRAP decision, which represented the “outer limit” of standing law and noted that
SCRAP explicitly stated that an injury sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss may not be
sufficient to be vindicated on the merits. Id. at 159 (noting that, on the merits, the plaintiff
must prove this “perceptible” harm to be an “immediate” harm); see also Lujan v. Nat’l
Wildlife Fed’n (Lujan I), 497 U.S. 871, 889 (1990) (similarly distinguishing SCRAP’s
“expansive expression” on procedural grounds).
66. See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Standing Still in the Roberts Court, 59 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 1061, 1062 (2009) (noting that “in some areas the Roberts Court does appear to have
reduced access to the courts”); Krista L. DeWitt, Note, The Revival of Standing As a
Limitation to Litigation: Will Standing Cause More Cases To Fall?, 31 AM. J. TRIAL
ADVOC. 601, 601 (2008) (outlining the apparent “resurfac[ing]” of standing); see also supra
note 22 and accompanying text; infra notes 98, 138–42 and accompanying text.
67. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc.,
454 U.S. 464, 486 (1982).
68. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring); cf.
infra note 74 (discussing voting interests in terms of second-class citizenship). See infra
Part I.B.1 for a discussion of the specific interests protected by the Establishment Clause.
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that can satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement “may reflect ‘aesthetic,
conservational, and recreational’” values.69 Claims based on environmental
law70 and election law71 often encompass these types of interests.
Additional noneconomic injuries include injury to individual reputation72
and privacy.73
Another type of noneconomic harm accepted by the Court is stigmatic
injury, which is often asserted in the civil rights context.74 In Allen v.
Wright,75 the Supreme Court noted that although the specific injury asserted
in the instant case was too abstract, “stigmatic injury” could be
cognizable.76 In subsequent decisions, the Court has made use of stigmatic
harm in certain contexts.77
69. Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970)
(quoting Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 354 F.2d 608, 616
(2d Cir. 1965)).
70. The noneconomic interests to be recognized as legally cognizable include “aesthetic
and recreational values.” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528
U.S. 167, 183 (2000) (citing Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 735 (1972)); see also
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562–63 (1992) (“Of course, the desire to use
or observe an animal species, even for purely esthetic purposes, is undeniably a cognizable
interest for purpose of standing.”).
71. See FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24–25 (1998) (finding informational injury-in-fact
caused by the lack of disclosure requirements, with plaintiffs’ stating that knowing which
candidates the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) supported would affect
their individual votes).
72. See Foretich v. United States, 351 F.3d 1198, 1213 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding that
plaintiff’s allegation that a disputed congressional act “harmed his reputation by embodying
a congressional determination that he is a child abuser and a danger to his own daughter”
was sufficient injury to confer Article III standing); see also ACORN v. United States, 618
F.3d 125, 133–35 (2d Cir. 2010) (relying on Foretich).
73. Privacy interests are often alleged as an injury in Fourth Amendment illegal search
and seizure cases. See, e.g., True v. Nebraska, 612 F.3d 676, 679 (8th Cir. 2010); Lewis v.
Tripp, 604 F.3d 1221, 1224 n.1 (10th Cir. 2010). Actions challenging employment
procedures that require employees to disclose large amounts of personal information have
also been sufficient to confer Article III standing. See, e.g., Roe v. Cheyenne Mountain
Conference Resort, Inc., 124 F.3d 1221, 1229 (10th Cir. 1997). Information-gathering
practices, particularly in the medical field, also have been held to sufficiently trigger privacy
interests. See, e.g., Citizens for Health v. Leavitt, 428 F.3d 167, 176 n.9 (3d Cir. 2005).
74. See generally Akhil Reed Amar & Jed Rubenfeld, A Dialogue, 115 YALE L.J. 2015
(2006) (discussing the relationship between voting rights and second-class citizenship); cf.
supra note 68 and accompanying text (discussing the harm associated with endorsement in
terms of political status and second-class citizenship).
75. 486 U.S. 737 (1984).
76. Id. at 755 (holding that, in order to confer standing, the stigma attached to racial
discrimination must be “suffered as a direct result of having personally been denied equal
treatment”).
77. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003) (noting that stigma is not
“trivial” in determining the merits); Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 739–40 (1984)
(noting that discrimination can cause noneconomic injury “by stigmatizing members of the
disfavored group as ‘innately inferior’ and therefore as less worthy participants in the
political community” (citations omitted)); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 239 (1982) (Powell,
J., concurring) (noting that the plaintiffs suffered from a “lifelong penalty and stigma”); see
also Dan M. Kahan et al., “They Saw A Protest”: Cognitive Illiberalism and the SpeechConduct Distinction, 64 STAN. L. REV. 851, 895 (2012) (“An individual who comes to see
behavior important to his cultural group as detrimental to society risks estrangement from
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However, as the alleged injury becomes less tangible and more
subjective, the court’s injury-in-fact inquiry must be more thorough.78
Even after a court recognizes a noneconomic interest as cognizable, the
plaintiff must still show that this alleged injury is particular and personal,79
as well as specific and imminent.80
a. Particularized and Personalized Injury
One concern regarding noneconomic injury is that it is often widely
shared and may not be personal to the plaintiff. Although the Supreme
Court has expressly rejected the argument that a widely shared injury is per
se insufficient to confer Article III standing,81 the Court has expressly
barred standing based on a federal “citizen suit” provision, where the only
interest asserted was “harm to his and every citizen’s interest in proper
application of the Constitution and laws.”82 In cases where the harm
asserted is widely shared, the Court has sought proof that the plaintiff truly
has a personal stake in the controversy by showing a particularized and
personal injury.83
For example, in Sierra Club v. Morton,84 an organization challenged the
construction of a proposed ski resort and recreation area in a national game
refuge and forest.85 The organization alleged that the development would
have a detrimental impact on the park and impair future enjoyment of the

those on whom he depends for material and emotional support.”). See generally Thomas
Healy, Stigmatic Harm and Standing, 92 IOWA L. REV. 417 (2007) (arguing that the Supreme
Court has never ruled out the use of stigmatic harm as sufficient injury and that this type of
injury is in fact sufficiently concrete).
78. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
79. See infra Part I.A.3.a.
80. See infra Part I.A.3.b.
81. See FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24 (1998) (“[T]he fact that a political forum may be
more readily available where an injury is widely shared . . . does not, by itself, automatically
disqualify an interest for Article III purposes.”); cf. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734
(1972) (“[T]he fact that particular environmental interests are shared by the many rather than
the few does not make them less deserving of legal protection through the judicial process.”).
82. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573 (1992); see also Schlesinger v.
Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 227 (1974) (“The proposition that all
constitutional provisions are enforceable by any citizen simply because citizens are the
ultimate beneficiaries of those provisions has no boundaries.”). Drawing from the separation
of powers doctrine, some argue that this type of suit infringes on the executive branch’s
“unitary” power of enforcement. See Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The
President’s Power To Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 595 (1994). But see Morton
Rosenberg, Congress’s Prerogative over Agencies and Agency Decisionmakers: The Rise
and Demise of the Reagan Administration’s Theory of the Unitary Executive, 57 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 627, 634 (1989).
83. See, e.g., City of L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101 (1983) (citing Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186, 204 (1962)). This issue of personal injury in a widely shared harm is often
litigated in the civil rights context, including cases claiming impermissible discrimination.
See supra notes 76–77 and accompanying text.
84. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
85. Id. at 729–30.
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area.86 While the Court acknowledged that “[a]esthetic and environmental
well-being . . . are important ingredients of the quality of life in our
society,”87 it nevertheless held that the organization failed to establish
sufficient injury-in-fact.
Although the organization asserted a cognizable interest in protecting the
environment, the Court reasoned that the organization itself was not
personally injured.88 The Court pointed out that the organization failed to
show any direct effect on the activities of it or its members that the
challenged development would cause.89
The dissenting Justices in Sierra Club, however, argued that “an
imaginative expansion of our traditional concepts of standing” was
necessary in order to ensure that organizations such as these had access to
the federal courts to litigate these cognizable environmental issues.90
Justice Harry Blackmun urged that “[t]his incursion upon tradition need not
be very extensive.”91 However, Justice Blackmun would only have
required that the plaintiff assert “a provable, sincere, dedicated, and
established status.”92
Similarly, Justice William O. Douglas’s dissenting opinion articulated
Justice Douglas
another “imaginative”93 alternative to standing.94
compared the Court’s willingness to grant legal personality to ships and
corporations and argued that this should be extended to natural elements.95
This specific approach to environmental standing would grant standing to
those who have a “meaningful relation” to and knowledge of the affected

86. Id. at 734.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 735. The Court noted that “a mere ‘interest in a problem,’ no matter how
longstanding the interest and no matter how qualified the organization is in evaluating the
problem, is not sufficient by itself to render the organization ‘adversely affected’ or
‘aggrieved.’” Id. at 739.
89. Id. at 735; see also Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n (Lujan I), 497 U.S. 871, 889 (1990)
(finding that the plaintiff lacked standing because alleging that one “uses unspecified
portions of an immense tract of territory, on some portions of which mining activity has
occurred or probably will occur by virtue of the [challenged] governmental action” is not a
cognizable injury (emphasis added)). But cf. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl.
Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 183–84 (2000) (holding that the plaintiffs’ “reasonable
concerns” about pollution “directly affected [their] recreational, aesthetic, and economic
interests”). For a discussion of a different type of challenge to a proposed development, see
infra notes 107–14 and accompanying text (discussing “neighborhood standing”).
90. Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 757 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan, id. at 755
(Brennan, J., dissenting), and Justice Douglas, id. at 741 (Douglas, J., dissenting), articulated
agreement with Justice Blackmun.
91. Id. at 757–58 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“We need not fear that Pandora’s box will
be opened or that there will be no limit to the number of those who desire to participate in
environmental litigation.”).
92. Id.
93. Id. (noting Justice Douglas’s opinion).
94. Id. at 744–45 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 742–43.
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entity’s “values.”96 This approach recognized that “the voice of the
existing beneficiaries of these environmental wonders should be heard.”97
However, the Court has failed to adopt any of the alternatives articulated by
the dissenting Sierra Club Justices.98
The Supreme Court again addressed its concern with generalized, rather
than particularized and personal, noneconomic injury in United States v.
Richardson,99 where it denied standing to a plaintiff seeking information
concerning CIA expenditures.100 The claimant alleged that without the
information, he would be unable to “intelligently follow” the actions of the
political branches, and he would thus be unable to exercise properly his
duty to vote in upcoming elections.101 In his opinion for the Court, Chief
Justice Warren E. Burger reasoned that such harm, even if cognizable, was
a mere generalized grievance as “the impact on him is plainly
undifferentiated and ‘common to all members of the public.’”102
Again in United States v. Hays,103 the Supreme Court denied standing to
a group of voters challenging a Louisiana redistricting scheme.104 The
Court employed “particularized” harm precedent and reasoned that a
plaintiff was required to show specific evidence that the scheme had
impermissibly excluded him or her from the district.105 However, the Court
noted that a voter who actually resided inside a challenged district could
potentially make the requisite showing of “individualized harm.”106
Similar to this recognition of “district standing” in Hays, lower courts
had previously granted standing to an entire neighborhood in a variety of
circumstances.107 Some circuits have conferred “neighborhood standing”

96. Id. at 743, 752. According to Justice Douglas, “[t]hose who hike it, fish it, hunt it,
camp in it, frequent it, or visit it merely to sit in solitude and wonderment are legitimate
spokesmen for it, whether they may be few or many.” Id. at 744–45.
97. Id. at 750.
98. See infra Part I.A.3.b for a more recent example of the Court’s failure to adopt an
alternative standing standard in the environmental context in Lujan, 504 U.S. 555, 561
(1992).
99. 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
100. Id. at 174–75.
101. Id. at 176.
102. Id. at 176–77 (citing Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 634 (1937)); Laird v. Tatum, 408
U.S. 1, 13 (1972). In Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee To Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208
(1974), a companion case to Richardson, Chief Justice Burger similarly denied standing to
plaintiffs who claimed that armed forces reserve membership by members of Congress was
in violation of the Incompatibility Clause. Id. at 209–10. The Court held that a generalized
interest in the proper application of the Constitution was “too abstract to constitute a ‘case or
controversy’ appropriate for judicial resolution.” Id. at 227. See infra Part I.A.3.b for further
discussion of the specificity necessary to prove concrete injury in a “citizen suit” claim.
103. 515 U.S. 737 (1995).
104. Id. at 743–45.
105. Id. at 745–46.
106. Id. at 744–45.
107. 13A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 45, § 3531.4, at 177–81; cf. Beauharnais v. Illinois,
343 U.S. 250, 258 (1952) (extending libel exception to free speech to remarks “directed at
designated collectivities” rather than specific individuals).
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on neighborhood members challenging the building of a new hotel,108 a
low-income housing project,109 a new high-rise apartment building,110 and a
housing development for the elderly and disabled.111 Besides challenging
real estate developments, neighborhoods have been found to have standing
to challenge allegedly inadequate police protection.112 The Supreme Court
has also recognized “neighborhood standing” in the context of racial
segregation.113 However, the Court has since made it clear that the concept
is limited to “relatively compact neighborhood[s].”114
Despite the requirement of particularized injury and the bar against
generalized grievances, the Court in FEC v. Akins115 held that a group of
voters did in fact have standing to bring suit.116 The plaintiffs sought
judicial review of the FEC’s decision not to classify the American Israel
Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) as a “political committee.”117 This
decision freed the organization from disclosure requirements concerning
membership, contributions, and expenditures under the Federal Election
Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA).118 The plaintiffs alleged that knowing
which candidates AIPAC supported would affect their individual votes, and
therefore sought to have the organization subject to these disclosure
requirements.119

108. Soc’y Hill Towers Owners’ Ass’n v. Rendell, 210 F.3d 168, 175–78 (3d Cir. 2000)
(alleging injuries that included traffic, pollution, and noise that would “detrimentally impact
the ambiance of their historic neighborhood” and their ability to use and enjoy the area
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
109. Alschuler v. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 686 F.2d 472, 476–77 (7th Cir. 1982)
(alleging that the project would harm to their neighborhood by “creating an imbalance in the
minority and low-income population,” that would lead to an increase in crime, strain
community resources, and decrease property value and the “special environmental,
recreational, cultural, historical and aesthetic qualities” of the area).
110. S. E. Lake View Neighbors v. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 685 F.2d 1027, 1034–
35 (7th Cir. 1982) (alleging injuries that included traffic and parking congestion, noise and
air pollution, population density, and violent crime).
111. Kirby v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 675 F.2d 60, 64 (3d Cir. 1982) (alleging
that the development would “attract numerous nonresidents of the Project who would not
otherwise come to the area” and decrease property values).
112. Neighborhood Action Coal. v. City of Canton, 882 F.2d 1012, 1016–17 (6th Cir.
1989) (indicating that the injuries alleged included slow police response to calls, the
deterioration of the neighborhood, a decrease in property values, a business that openly sells
alcohol to minors, and “the presence of unsavory individuals around their homes”).
113. Gladstone Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 111–14 (1979) (alleging
violations by real estate brokerage firms that were depriving plaintiff village residents—as
defined in terms of city blocks in a suburban neighborhood, rather than apartment
buildings—of “social and professional benefits of living in an integrated society”).
114. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 377 (1982) (citation omitted).
115. 524 U.S. 11 (1998).
116. Id. at 29.
117. Id. at 13.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 21.
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The Court first addressed—and dismissed—various grounds challenging
the group’s standing,120 before rejecting the notion that a widely shared
injury is per se insufficient to confer standing.121 While acknowledging
that it is often the case that an abstract interest is widely shared,122 the
Court emphasized that if a widely shared interest is “sufficiently concrete
and specific,” it may satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement.123 Thus, the
Akins Court found that the alleged injury was not a generalized grievance
because the “informational injury” was “directly related to voting, the most
basic of political rights” and was, therefore, sufficient to permit Congress to
authorize the judiciary to confer Article III standing.124
b. Specific and Imminent Noneconomic Injury
Besides a showing of personal injury,125 the Supreme Court also requires
a plaintiff to show specifically when and where126 the injury has occurred or
will occur. In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,127 the Court denied standing
to an environmental interest group.128 The Court found that the plaintiff
organization failed to assert sufficiently imminent injury as none of the
members alleged that they had any immediate plans to return to Sri Lanka,
the affected area.129 In his opinion for the Court, Justice Scalia found that
Plaintiffs’ affidavits failed to allege sufficient injury as the claims did not
specifically allege when they would personally suffer the claimed injury.130

120. First, the Court held that the injury asserted fell within the “zone of interests” that
Congress intended to protect when enacting FECA. Id. at 20. The Court also distinguished
Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974), relying, inter alia, on the fact that the instant case was
grounded on “voter standing” rather than “taxpayer standing.” Akins, 524 U.S. at 22.
121. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
122. Akins, 524 U.S. at 24. The Court gave various examples of widely shared and
abstract harms. Id. at 23–24 (citing L. Singer & Sons v. Union Pac. R.R., 311 U.S. 295, 303
(1940) (injury to the “common concern for obedience to law”); Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572–78 (1992)).
123. Id. at 24–25.
124. Id. The Court did note, however, that the widely shared nature of the harm was the
“strongest argument” against conferring standing. Id. at 23. See infra note 330 and
accompanying text for analysis of the Court’s reasoning.
125. See supra Part I.A.3.a.
126. See supra note 89 for a discussion of Lujan I and its analysis of the requisite
specificity of the place of injury.
127. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
128. Id. at 578. The organization sought to prevent government action that could
“increas[e] the rate of extinction of endangered and threatened species,” that the plaintiffs
wished to observe. Id. at 562 (internal quotation marks omitted).
129. Id. at 563–64.
130. Id. In his analysis, Justice Scalia noted that although one of the affidavits cited an
intention to go back to Sri Lanka, in a later deposition, it was noted that the affiant did not
know when she would return to Sri Lanka, as a Civil War was currently being fought there.
Id. (“Such ‘some day’ intentions—without any description of concrete plans, or indeed even
any specification of when the some day will be—do not support a finding of the ‘actual or
imminent’ injury that our cases require.”).
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In his concurring opinion, Justice Anthony Kennedy noted that requiring
the plaintiffs to buy airline tickets might seem “trivial.”131 However, he
clarified that this concern was not an issue in the instant case as it was not
unreasonable to doubt that the plaintiffs visited the relevant sites
regularly.132 Voicing a similar concern in his concurrence, Justice John
Paul Stevens noted that the “imminence” of an injury should not be
measured according to when the plaintiff would directly suffer due to the
environmental harm.133 Rather, Justice Stevens would determine imminent
injury more generally, considering the probability and timing of the
threatened harm.134
However, in his dissent, Justice Blackmun, with whom Justice Sandra
Day O’Connor joined, lamented the Court’s “slash-and-burn expedition
through the law of environmental standing.”135 Quoting Marbury v.
Madison,136 Justice Blackmun urged that “‘the very essence of civil liberty
certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of
the laws, whenever he receives an injury.’”137
Because of this apparently heightened pleading requirement, scholars
have argued that Lujan represents a more restrictive approach to
standing.138 Specifically, a leading commentator has argued that the Lujan
court turned the permissive limitation against generalized grievances into an
immutable constitutional requirement.139 While the Akins Court rejected a
per se ban on widely shared injury,140 particularly in the context of
congressional authorization, the Lujan opinion appears to place a limit on
the scope of congressional authority to enact “citizen suit” provisions141 to
create causes of action.142
131. Id. at 579 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Justice
Blackmun, in his dissent, also noted that there existed no “substantial barrier” preventing a
plaintiff from buying an airline ticket. Id. at 592 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
132. Id. at 579 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
133. Id. at 583 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 606 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). This reflects similar concerns raised by the
dissenting Justices, including Justice Blackmun, in Sierra Club. See supra notes 90–97 and
accompanying text.
136. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
137. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 606 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also supra note 24 and
accompanying text (discussing how access to the court system is a fundamental right).
138. Sunstein, supra note 42, at 226–27 (“Before Lujan, requiring people to obtain a
plane ticket or to make firm plans to visit the habitat of endangered species might well have
been unnecessarily formalistic. Now such actions are apparently required.”). See supra
notes 22–66 for arguments that there is a larger trend toward more restrictive standing.
139. Sunstein, supra note 42, at 200–01. But see David J. Weiner, Note, The New Law of
Legislative Standing, 54 STAN. L. REV. 205, 223 (2001) (arguing that subsequent cases
“eroded” Lujan’s “robust interpretation of the ban on generalized grievances”).
140. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
141. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
142. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573 (rejecting the argument that the injury-in-fact requirement is
automatically “satisfied by congressional conferral upon all persons of an abstract, selfcontained, noninstrumental ‘right’ to have the Executive observe the procedures required by
law”). But cf. id. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Congress has the power to define
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B. Litigating the Establishment Clause
The Establishment Clause143 protects a uniquely subjective spiritual and
value-laden interest.144 The Supreme Court has recognized that “[a] person
or a family may have a spiritual stake in First Amendment values sufficient
to give standing to raise issues concerning the Establishment Clause and the
Free Exercise Clause.”145
The Establishment Clause functions not merely to bar governmentendorsed religion146 but also to maximize religious liberty.147 The concept
of the separation of church and state, first introduced into the vernacular by
Thomas Jefferson,148 has been interpreted both as a “wall” requiring
“separation for its own sake” and as a mechanism ensuring “religious
liberty and equality.”149
This liberty encompasses not only the freedom to actively participate in
any religion but also to ensure that adherence to religion is not made
“relevant in any way to a person’s standing in the political community.”150
injuries and articulate chains of causation that will give rise to a case or controversy where
none existed before . . . .”).
143. The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment states: “Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Establishment
Clause has been incorporated against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. See
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
144. See, e.g., McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 883 (2005) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring) (noting that the Framers had a special “respect for religion’s special role in
society”); Suhre v. Haywood Cnty., 131 F.3d 1083, 1086 (4th Cir. 1997). But see Noah
Feldman, From Liberty to Equality: The Transformation of the Establishment Clause,
90 CALIF. L. REV. 673, 677 (2002) (arguing that religious minorities are no more “special”
than other minority groups).
145. Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970)
(citing Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963)).
146. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 103–04 (1968) (“The concern of [James] Madison
and his supporters was quite clearly that religious liberty ultimately would be the victim if
government could employ its taxing and spending powers to aid one religion over another or
to aid religion in general.” (discussing 2 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 183, 186 (Hunt ed.
1901))).
147. See McCreary, 545 U.S. at 860 (“The touchstone for our analysis is the principle that
the ‘First Amendment mandates governmental neutrality between religion and religion, and
between religion and nonreligion.’” (quoting Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104
(1968))); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 68 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (stating that
the Religion Clauses’ “common purpose is to secure religious liberty.” (citing Engel v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962))).
148. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Danbury Baptists (Jan. 1, 1802), available at
http://www.loc.gov/loc/lcib/9806/danpre.html (“I contemplate with sovereign reverence that
act of the whole American people which declared that their legislature should ‘make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,’ thus
building a wall of separation between Church & State.”).
149. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND
PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY 218–22 (2012) (“The proper touchstones [of Establishment Clause
jurisprudence] are religious liberty and equality, not separation . . . . In short, the watchword
is not ‘separate’—but ‘equal.’”).
150. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring). The
Lynch court dealt with a challenge to a public Christmas-themed display of religion. Id. at
671. See infra notes 204–10 for a more in-depth discussion of this case.
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This precludes the government from aiding a single religion, aiding all
religions, preferring one religion over another, becoming involved—either
directly or indirectly—in the activities of religious organizations, or
punishing any individual from “professing religious beliefs or
disbeliefs.”151
1. Interests Protected by the Establishment Clause
It has been noted that “[a] paramount purpose of the Establishment
Clause is to protect . . . a person from being made to feel like an outsider in
matters of faith, and a stranger in the political community.”152 Due to the
unique nature of this harm, Establishment Clause challenges, along with
other First Amendment claims, usually allege noneconomic injuries.153
In her concurring opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly,154 Justice O’Connor
characterized the unusual type of harm caused by the perceived
endorsement of religion through a public display as the consequence of
sending “a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders [and] not full
members of the political community.”155 The Supreme Court has referred
to this harm to an individual’s political status as social stigma.156
Although outside of the scope of this Note, other Establishment Clause
challenges include challenges to prayer in public schools,157 the exclusion
or inclusion of evolution or creationism in the public school curriculum,158
and the use of taxpayer dollars to support religious purposes.159 Some

151. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1947).
152. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 799 (1995)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687 (O’Connor, J., concurring)).
153. See, e.g., Vasquez v. L.A. Cnty., 487 F.3d 1246, 1250 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he
Establishment Clause is primarily aimed at protecting non-economic interests of a spiritual,
as opposed to a physical or pecuniary, nature.”); see also 13A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 45,
§ 3531.4, at 197–204.
154. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
155. Id. at 688 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
156. See, e.g., Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 290 (1963)
(reasoning that students would “continue to participate in exercises distasteful to them
because of an understandable reluctance to be stigmatized as atheists or nonconformists
simply on the basis of their request”); see also supra notes 76–77 and accompanying text.
157. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 40, 56 (1985) (invalidating an Alabama
statute authorizing a daily period of silence in public schools for meditation or voluntary
prayer).
158. See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 592–94 (1987) (invalidating a
Louisiana law requiring that creation science be taught in public schools, along with
evolution); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103 (1968) (invalidating an Arkansas statute
that prohibited the teaching of human evolution in the public schools). See generally David
R. Bauer, Note, Resolving the Controversy over “Teaching the Controversy”: The
Constitutionality of Teaching Intelligent Design in Public Schools, 75 FORDHAM L. REV
1019 (2006) (detailing the relevant jurisprudence).
159. See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 88 (1968) (holding that federal taxpayers had
standing to sue to prevent such expenditures on the grounds that such expenditures were
prohibited by Establishment Clause).
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Establishment Clause claims focus on an inquiry into the purpose160 behind
the challenged activity, while others focus on the nature of the personal
harm asserted by the challenger.161
In Flast v. Cohen,162 the Supreme Court created an exception to the
generally recognized bar against taxpayer standing.163 The Court held that
a plaintiff’s status as a federal taxpayer could be sufficient to confer Article
III standing if a “logical nexus” existed (1) between the taxpayer’s “status
and the type of legislative enactment attacked”164 and (2) between the
claimant’s taxpayer “status and the precise nature of the constitutional
infringement alleged.”165 In carving out the exception, former Chief Justice
Earl Warren emphasized both the purposes behind standing doctrine166 and
the particular economic interests protected by the Establishment Clause.167
However, the Supreme Court has gone on to narrowly limit the Flast
exception.168 The Court first reinterpreted this expectation in Valley
Forge.169 There, the Court first distinguished Flast and denied the
Next, Justice Rehnquist’s analysis
plaintiffs taxpayer standing.170
incorporated the Court’s generalized grievances precedent, stating that the
plaintiffs “fail to identify any personal injury suffered by them as a
160. See, e.g., Edwards, 482 U.S. at 592 (invalidating a Louisiana law requiring that
creation science be taught in public schools, along with evolution, because its “primary
purpose” was specifically to advance a particular religion); Wallace, 472 U.S. at 56
(invalidating an Alabama statute authorizing a daily period of silence in public schools for
meditation or voluntary prayer because it was an endorsement of religion lacking “any
clearly secular purpose”).
161. For example, plaintiffs challenging the specific use of public funds assert an
economic-based interest. This inquiry focuses not on the spending’s purpose but on the
spending’s effect on the taxpayer. See, e.g., Flast, 392 U.S. at 106 (“The taxpayer’s
allegation in such cases would be that his tax money is being extracted and spent in violation
of specific constitutional protections against such abuses of legislative power.” (emphasis
added)).
162. 393 U.S. 83 (1968).
163. Id. at 101; cf. Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 487 (1923) (finding no taxpayer
standing because the interest asserted was comparatively “minute and indeterminable” and
that future tax injury was “remote, fluctuating, and uncertain”). See generally Joshua G.
Urquhart, Disfavored Constitution, Passive Virtues? Linking State Constitutional Fiscal
Limitations and Permissive Taxpayer Standing Doctrines, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1263, 1268–
72 (2012) (detailing the traditional bar against federal taxpayer standing and the narrow
exception for Establishment Clause cases).
164. Flast, 392 U.S. at 102.
165. Id. at 102–03.
166. Id. at 94–95.
167. Id. at 103–04.
168. Compare id. (recognizing a taxpayer standing exception under the Establishment
Clause), with Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1447–48 (2011)
(limiting the Flast exception to government expenditures, distinguishing such spending from
the challenged tax credits), and Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587,
603 (2007) (limiting the Flast exception to expenditures “made pursuant to an express
congressional mandate and a specific congressional appropriation” and holding the exception
inapplicable to expenditures of executive branch funding of faith-based initiatives).
169. 454 U.S. 464, 480 (1982).
170. Id. at 479 (“Flast limited taxpayer standing to challenges directed ‘only [at]
exercises of congressional power.’”).
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consequence of the alleged constitutional error, other than the psychological
consequence presumably produced by observation of conduct with which
one disagrees.”171 Justice Rehnquist reasoned that this “psychological
consequence” was not a cognizable injury.172
Unlike the challenges that focus on the purpose behind the legislation,173
this analysis expressly turned on the insufficient effect the activity had on
the challengers.174 Post Valley Forge the Court has continued to limit the
reach of the Flast exception.175 However, as Justice Elena Kagan recently
noted in her dissent in Arizona Christian School Tuition Org. v. Winn,176
this narrow interpretation effectively “diminish[es] the Establishment
Clause’s force and meaning.”177 This is particularly problematic if one
considers “[t]he very purpose of a Bill of Rights” to be “withdraw[ing]
certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them
beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal
principles to be applied by the courts.”178
2. The Endorsement Test and the Merits of Establishment Clause Claims
Although this Note does not address the merits determination in
Establishment Clause cases, the nature of the prevailing merits test—the
endorsement test179—is an essential consideration when crafting an injury
171. Id. at 485–86.
172. Id. This language has been cited by courts and scholars alike to stand for the
proposition that a spiritual disagreement with a display is not a sufficient injury. See supra
note 22 and accompanying text; infra note 303 and accompanying text. However, “[o]ne has
to read the whole Valley Forge sentence quoted, and not stop at ‘psychological
consequence,’ to understand it.” Catholic League for Religious & Civil Rights v. San
Francisco, 624 F.3d 1043, 1052 (9th Cir. 2010); Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v.
Saccone, 1:12-CV-536, 2012 WL 4497544 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 1, 2012) (“[A] ‘psychological
consequence’ fails to establish standing when it is born merely of disagreement with
government conduct, but it does constitute a concrete harm when it is produced by
‘government condemnation of one's own religion or endorsement of another’s in one’s own
community.’”).
173. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
174. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
175. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
176. 131 S. Ct. 1436 (2011).
177. Id. at 1451 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“Sometimes, no one other than taxpayers has
suffered the injury necessary to challenge government sponsorship of religion.”). See
William P. Marshall & Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Not a Winn-Win: Misconstruing Standing and
the Establishment Clause, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 215 (arguing that Winn not only limits
taxpayer standing, but also undermines Establishment Clause jurisprudence more generally);
cf. Steven K. Green, The Slow, Tragic Demise of Standing in Establishment Clause
Challenges, AM. CONST. SOC’Y FOR LAW & POL’Y: ISSUE BRIEF, 1–2 (Sept. 22, 2011),
http://www.acslaw.org/sites/default/files/Green_-_Establishment_Clause.pdf (“[C]ourts will
effectively be throwing Establishment Clause questions . . . to the politically elected
branches . . . . Political expediency, rather than constitutional fealty, will become the rule of
law . . . .”).
178. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
179. The endorsement test was first articulated in Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion
in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 691 (1984), and was adopted by the Court in County of
Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 593–94 (1989). However,
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standard for public display standing.180 Courts and scholars alike have
criticized the test.181 However, it still remains good law182 and is the
prevailing standard applied to the merits in “public display” cases.183
According to the test, a court must examine (1) what the City “intended
to communicate in displaying” the symbol, and (2) “what message the

the Lynch majority conducted a contextual analysis of the entire Christmas season, rather
than focusing exclusively on the religious component of the nativity scene at issue. Lynch,
465 U.S. at 679–80; see also Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 726 n.1 (2005) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (approving the Court’s decision not to apply the existing and “discredited”
Lemon test). See infra note 184 for a description of the Lemon test.
180. For further discussion of the alleged tension between standing doctrine and the
endorsement test, see infra Parts II and III.A.2.
181. See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 19–20, Davenport v. Am. Atheists, Inc.,
132 S. Ct. 12 (2011) (No. 10-1297), 2011 WL 1540434 (“Over the past three decades, five
Justices—Justices Kennedy, Scalia, Thomas, and White, and Chief Justice Rehnquist—have
expressly called for rejecting the endorsement test as ‘flawed in its fundamentals and
unworkable in practice.’ . . . Moreover, three additional Justices—Chief Justice Roberts and
Justices Breyer and Alito—have expressed doubts about whether it is the proper test to
apply.” (internal citations omitted)); see also Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 685–86
(2005) (plurality opinion) (citing inconsistent application of the test); E. Duncan Getchell, Jr.
& Michael H. Brady, How the Constitutions of the Thirty-Seven States in Effect When the
Fourteenth Amendment Was Adopted Demonstrate That the Governmental Endorsement
Test in Establishment Clause Jurisprudence Is Contrary to American History and Tradition,
17 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 125, 184 (2012) (arguing that, at the time of incorporation,
“nonestablishment values [did not] include[] a psychological component of preventing
offense caused by the endorsement or accommodation of religion” and, therefore, the
endorsement test “must be regarded not merely as ahistorical but as antihistorical”); Steven
D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment Neutrality and the
“No Endorsement” Test, 86 MICH. L. REV. 266, 276 (1987) (arguing that the analytic
framework behind the test is flawed and serves to “create serious difficulties in application—
difficulties that . . . only serve to aggravate existing doctrinal confusion”); cf. Abner S.
Greene, The Apparent Consistency of Religion Clause Doctrine, 21 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y
225, 260 (2006) (The development of the endorsement test “has revealed that the focus on
whether the government benefits or burdens religion as part of a larger class or, rather, in a
targeted fashion, does not properly grasp the way in which the doctrine treats religion as
distinctive, at least for Establishment Clause purposes.”).
182. In denying certiorari, the Supreme Court recently had the opportunity to replace the
endorsement test. Utah Highway Patrol Ass’n v. Am. Atheists, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 12 (2011);
see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 181, at 19 (“This case presents an ideal
vehicle for the Court to set aside the endorsement test and adopt the coercion test instead.”);
Mark Strasser, The Endorsement Test Is Alive and Well: A Cause for Celebration and
Sorrow, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 1273 (2013); cf. B. Jessie Hill, (Dis)owning Religious Speech, 20
GEO. MASON L. REV. 361, 366–67 (2013) (arguing, inter alia, that although the endorsement
test has been “temporarily marginalized,” it is preferable to other alternatives).
183. See, e.g., Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 593–94 (employing the endorsement test);
Weinbaum v. City of Las Cruces, 541 F.3d 1017, 1032 (10th Cir. 2008) (employing a hybrid
Lemon/endorsement test); Modrovich v. Allegheny Cnty., 385 F.3d 397, 406 (3d Cir. 2004)
(applying both the Lemon test and the endorsement test, although the court found “the
endorsement test to be the appropriate standard by which to scrutinize” the symbol). But see
Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 686 (declining to apply the Lemon test and instead analyzing “the
nature of the monument” in the context of “our Nation’s history”); Card v. City of Everett,
520 F.3d 1009, 1021 (9th Cir. 2008) (declining to apply the Lemon test or the endorsement
test, following Van Orden).
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city’s display actually conveyed.”184 When applying this test, the court
must consider “both the subjective and the objective components of the
message.”185 Often, under the purpose prong of the test, “an understanding
of official objective emerges from readily discoverable fact, without any
judicial psychoanalysis of a drafter’s heart of hearts.”186 These externally
verifiable “facts” include the text, legislative history, and implementation of
the disputed action.187
Under the effect prong, the inquiry into the effect of the display is
measured against a “reasonable observer” standard.188 The Court must
determine whether such an observer would view the challenged action as a
symbol of the government’s “disapproval of his or her particular religious
choices.”189 It is important to stress that the endorsement test is not about
the perceptions of particular individuals and their “discomfort” caused by
viewing religious symbols.190 Rather, the Test seeks to determine whether
the government has actually “inject[ed] religion into the political life of the
citizenry,” either by acts of favoritism or by a disregard for the obvious
effect on the reasonable observer.191
In another concurring opinion, Justice O’Connor elaborated that “the
‘history and ubiquity’ of a practice is relevant because it provides part of
the context in which a reasonable observer evaluates whether a challenged
governmental practice conveys a message of endorsement of religion.”192
184. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Justice O’Connor compared this
endorsement test to the “purpose and effect prongs,” id., of the test previously articulated in
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). The Lemon test required that a state statute,
policy, or action (1) “have a secular legislative purpose,” (2) with “its principal or primary
effect” being “one that neither advances nor inhibits religion,” and (3) that does “not foster
‘an excessive government entanglement with religion.’” Id. at 612–13 (emphasis added)
(citation omitted). Due to this similarity, many lower courts employ a “hybrid”
Lemon/endorsement test in these cases. See, e.g., Weinbaum, 541 F.3d at 1032.
185. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Justice O’Connor noted that
when “the audience is large, as it always is when government ‘speaks’ by word or deed,
some portion of the audience will inevitably receive a message determined by the ‘objective’
content of the statement, and some portion will inevitably receive the intended message.” Id.
186. McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky, 545 U.S. 844, 862 (2005) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (citing Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 74 (1985) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring in the judgment)).
187. Id.; Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 594–95 (1987) (The inquiry looks to the
“plain meaning of the statute’s words, enlightened by their context and the contemporaneous
legislative history [and] the historical context of the statute, . . . and the specific sequence of
events leading to [its] passage.”).
188. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 620.
189. Id. at 631.
190. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 779 (1995)
(plurality opinion).
191. Id.
192. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 630 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment); see also Pinette, 515 U.S. at 778 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (reiterating the use of history as an important factor when
evaluating endorsement). But see id. at 807–08 n.14 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“I would not
find this argument convincing, because it assumes that all reasonable viewers know all about
the history of [the display]—a highly unlikely supposition.”). See infra Part III and text
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This evaluation may consider any secular purpose(s) currently served by the
display, especially if the monument has lost much of its religious
significance.193
The Court has noted that Establishment Clause challenges often require a
detailed and fact-specific contextual inquiry.194 As each case presents a
different contextual framework, the Court does not always conduct an
inquiry into the government’s purpose and may instead rely solely on the
objective effect of the challenged action.195 Accordingly, the Court has
been reluctant to confine its Establishment Clause jurisprudence to any
single test.196 Therefore, the requisite injury-in-fact necessary to have a
viable Establishment Clause challenge remains undefined as the Court has
yet to articulate any bright-line rules concerning what constitutes a
violation.197
II. STANDING IN “PUBLIC DISPLAY” OF RELIGION CASES:
CIRCUIT COURT CONFUSION IN THE FACE OF SUPREME COURT SILENCE
Challenges to alleged “public displays” of religion,198 a subsection of
Establishment Clause cases, raise a distinct problem for federal standing
doctrine, particularly for the injury-in-fact requirement.199 Specifically, this
accompanying notes 355–56 for a discussion on the evaluation of history in the standing
context.
193. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 630–31 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment).
194. McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 867–68 (2005) (“[U]nder the
Establishment Clause detail is key.”); Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 595 (opinion of Blackmun, J.)
(“[T]he question is what viewers may fairly understand to be the purpose of the display.
That inquiry, of necessity, turns upon the context in which the contested object appears.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
195. Most notably, the Court avoided an inquiry into purpose when rejecting a challenge
to a Ten Commandments monument. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 691–92 (2005)
(plurality opinion); see infra note 227 and accompanying text.
196. See, e.g., Bauchman v. W. High Sch., 132 F.3d 542, 550 (10th Cir. 1997) (“[The]
Supreme Court repeatedly has recognized there can be no precise Establishment Clause test
capable of ready application, and therefore has resisted confining such sensitive analyses to
‘any single test or criterion.’” (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679 (1984))).
197. Compare McCreary, 545 U.S. at 850–51 (finding a Ten Commandments wall
hanging to be impermissible), with Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 692 (finding a Ten
Commandments monument to be permissible).
198. “Public display of religion” cases—also known as “passive monument” cases—often
concern the display of religious symbols and/or text on public land. See, e.g., McCreary, 545
U.S. at 851 (concerning large, framed copies of an abridged version the Ten Commandments
in the county courthouse); Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 681 (concerning a very large monument
inscribed with the text of the Ten Commandments, located between the Texas State Capitol
and the state’s supreme court building); Capitol Square Review Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753,
759 (1995) (plurality opinion) (concerning a large, unattended Latin cross on a public square
adjacent to the courthouse); Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 578 (concerning a freestanding display of
a nativity scene on the main staircase of a county courthouse and a Chanukah menorah
placed next to a Christmas tree in the city-county building); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 671
(concerning a Christmas display on public land consisting of, among other things, a Santa
Claus, a Christmas tree, and a crèche).
199. Cooper v. U.S. Postal Serv., 577 F.3d 479, 490 (2d Cir. 2009) (“Lower courts are
left to find a threshold for injury and determine somewhat arbitrarily whether that threshold
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Note analyzes the apparent tension that arises when trying to reconcile the
constitutional standing requirement of “injury-in-fact” with the prevailing
merits standard, the endorsement test. Part II.A first lays out the Supreme
Court’s guidance concerning public display cases. Part II.B of this Note
then discusses the different approaches adopted by the various circuits.
A. Public Display Cases and the Supreme Court’s Silence on Standing
The Supreme Court has heard a few public display challenges200 but has
yet to address the issue of standing in a public display case.201
Nevertheless, these cases are particularly important as some lower courts
have interpreted the Court’s silence on the standing question as an implicit
endorsement of nontaxpayer202 standing in public display cases.203
In Lynch v. Donnelly, the Court heard a challenge to a Christmas display
on public land.204 The display consisted entirely of items owned by the city
of Pawtucket, Rhode Island, and included a Santa Claus figurine, a
Christmas tree, carolers, and a crèche (also referred to as a nativity
scene).205 The Court held that, notwithstanding the religious significance of
the nativity scene, the city did not violate the Establishment Clause.206 The
Lynch Court, however, did not conduct a standing inquiry.207

has been reached . . . . [T]here is uncertainty concerning how to apply the injury in fact
requirement in the Establishment Clause context.”).
200. See supra note 198 for a list of the Court’s public display cases heard by the
Supreme Court.
201. Some scholars speculate that this silence is representative of the Court’s desire to
rethink Establishment Clause jurisprudence, including standing. See, e.g., Douglas W.
Kmiec, Standing Still—Did the Roberts Court Narrow, but Not Overrule, Flast To Allow
Time To Re-think Establishment Clause Jurisprudence?, 35 PEPP. L. REV. 509, 509 (2008);
Mark C. Rahdert, Court Reform and Breathing Space Under the Establishment Clause, 87
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 835, 841 (2012).
202. Nontaxpayer standing refers to claims based on a noneconomic interest. In an
Establishment Clause challenge, this also references an evaluation of standing outside the
Flast exception.
203. See infra notes 263–67 and accompanying text. However, it is important to note that
failure to address a jurisdictional issue does not constitute binding precedent. Ariz. Christian
Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1448 (2011) (“When a potential jurisdictional
defect is neither noted nor discussed in a federal decision, the decision does not stand for the
proposition that no defect existed.”); Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 533 n.5 (1974);
United States v. L.A. Tucker Truck Lines, Inc., 344 U.S. 33, 38 (1952).
204. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
205. Id. at 671.
206. Id. at 687. See supra note 179 for a discussion of the Court’s reasoning.
207. The district court had granted municipal taxpayer standing to the plaintiffs. Donnelly
v. Lynch, 525 F. Supp. 1150, 1162 (D.R.I. 1981), aff’d, 691 F.2d 1029 (1st Cir. 1982), rev’d,
465 U.S. 668 (1984). The First Circuit affirmed. Donnelly v. Lynch, 691 F.2d 1029, 1032
(1st Cir. 1982), rev’d, 465 U.S. 668 (1984). The issue of municipal taxpayer standing is
outside the scope of this Note. However, plaintiffs have not been relying on taxpayer status
as grounds for conferring standing. See, e.g., Red River Freethinkers v. City of Fargo, 679
F.3d 1015, 1022 n.6 (8th Cir. 2012) (“Although [Plaintiff] was at one point asserting
taxpayer standing it appears to have abandoned this theory below . . . .”).
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The more lasting effect of the Lynch case, however, came from Justice
O’Connor’s concurring opinion, which articulated the endorsement test.208
This test focuses on the harm associated with being made to feel that one
has “outsider” status in one’s own community.209 Moreover, in his dissent,
Justice William J. Brennan Jr., with whom Justices Thurgood Marshall,
Blackmun and Stevens joined, referred to the plaintiffs’ alleged exclusion
as “an insult and an injury” that should not be permitted under the
Establishment Clause.210
Similarly, in County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh
Chapter,211 the Court issued a split merits determination in a public display
case but did not question the lower court’s grant of standing.212 The case
concerned freestanding displays of a nativity scene on the main staircase of
a county courthouse and a Chanukah menorah placed next to a Christmas
tree in the city-county building.213 The Court found the nativity scene to be
impermissible,214 but the menorah and Christmas tree display to be
permissible.215
The Allegheny Court did not conduct a standing inquiry. However, the
Third Circuit216 had noted that the district judge had stated that “‘[t]here
must be more substantial injury than mere offense that is felt inwardly.’”217
Reversing the district court’s merits determination, the Third Circuit held
that both of the disputed symbols did in fact violate the Establishment
Clause—without conducting its own standing inquiry.218
In Capitol Square Review & Advisory Board v. Pinette,219 the Supreme
Court upheld Ohio’s decision to permit a private party, the Ku Klux Klan,
to display an unattended Latin cross on the grounds of the state capitol.220
Neither the lower courts nor the Supreme Court, conducted a standing

208. See supra Part I.B.2.
209. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
210. Id. at 709 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“To be so excluded on religious grounds by
one’s elected government is an insult and an injury that, until today, could not be
countenanced by the Establishment Clause.”).
211. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
212. Id. at 621.
213. Id. at 578.
214. Id. at 598 (distinguishing this crèche from the crèche in Lynch, as “nothing in the
context of th[is] display detracts from the crèche’s religious message,” as the crèche stood
alone as a separate display).
215. Id. at 612–13, 620. The Court noted that the “overall holiday setting” did not, in
itself, make the display permissible, as government endorsement of any religion(s) is
impermissible. Id. at 614–15. However, the context of the holiday display had the effect of
celebrating the secular, rather than the religious, aspects of the holidays. Id. at 615.
216. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 842 F.2d 655 (3d Cir.
1988), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
217. Id. at 658.
218. Id. at 662–63.
219. 515 U.S. 753 (1995).
220. Id. at 770 (plurality opinion).
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inquiry. However, the district court did find that the plaintiffs would suffer
irreparable injury in the absence of a preliminary injunction.221
In his opinion announcing the judgment of the Court, Justice Scalia
stated that “[r]eligious expression cannot violate the Establishment Clause
where it (1) is purely private and (2) occurs in a traditional or designated
public forum, publicly announced and open to all on equal terms.”222
However, in his dissent, Justice Stevens focused on the effect of the display
and stated that he would not permit the display, as these perceptions of
endorsement were impermissible under the Establishment Clause.223
In Van Orden v. Perry,224 the Court held that the disputed symbol did not
violate the Establishment Clause.225 The challenged display consisted of a
very large monument inscribed with the text of the Ten Commandments,
located between the Texas State Capitol and the state’s supreme court
building.226 The Van Orden Court avoided conducting an explicit inquiry
into governmental purpose, instead focusing on the monument’s current
“dual significance.”227
Though the Supreme Court did not conduct a standing inquiry,228 the
district court—in an unreported opinion—found that the plaintiff’s frequent
and unwelcome contact with the disputed symbol, which he found
offensive, satisfied the injury-in-fact requirement.229 The district court
noted, however, that standing was conferred due to the “very liberal
interpretation” of standing in Establishment Clause cases taken by courts.230
In McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky,231 the Supreme Court
affirmed the lower courts’ enforcement of a preliminary injunction
preventing the county from displaying large, framed copies of an abridged
version of the Ten Commandments in the county courthouse.232 The Court
affirmed the preliminary injunction, finding support in evidence showing
221. Pinette v. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd., 844 F. Supp. 1182, 1184 (S.D.
Ohio 1993), aff’d, 30 F.3d 675 (6th Cir. 1994), aff’d, 515 U.S. 753 (1995).
222. Pinette, 515 U.S. at 770 (plurality opinion).
223. Id. at 798 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Some might have perceived it as a message of
love, others as a message of hate, still others as a message of exclusion—a statehouse sign
calling powerfully to mind their outsider status.”).
224. 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
225. Id. at 692.
226. Id. at 681.
227. Id. at 691–92; see also Andrew D. Cohen, Note, How The Establishment Clause Can
Influence Substantive Due Process: Adultery Bans After Lawrence, 79 FORDHAM L. REV.
605, 629 (2010) (noting that although the Court usually requires a “detailed inquiry into the
legislative purpose of an enactment to seek out an objectively true secular purpose,” it
avoided such an inquiry in Van Orden).
228. But see Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 694 (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting that “[t]he only
injury to [the plaintiff] is that he takes offense at seeing the monument as he passes it on his
way to the Texas Supreme Court Library”).
229. Van Orden v. Perry, No. A-01-CA-833-H, 2002 WL 32737462, at *2 (W.D. Tex.
Oct. 2, 2002), aff’d, 351 F.3d 173 (5th Cir. 2003), aff’d, 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
230. Id.
231. 545 U.S. 844 (2005).
232. Id. at 851–55.
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that the counties’ purpose was to “emphasize and celebrate the
Commandments’ religious message,” in violation of the First
Amendment.233
While the McCreary Court did not conduct a standing inquiry, the district
court did address the issue.234 The district court considered the fact that the
display was easily visible in the county courthouse.235 The district court
also noted that the symbol was observed in the place where the plaintiffs
and other citizens go to conduct civic business, including obtaining and
renewing driver’s licenses and permits, registering cars, paying local taxes,
and registering to vote.236 The district court found that the plaintiffs had
standing as they unavoidably encountered the symbol each time they were
required to enter the courthouse.237
The “effect” of the display on the challenger tends to play a greater role
in evaluating endorsement in public display cases, as compared to other
types of Establishment Clause challenges, which focus more on the
“purpose” behind the challenged activity.238 This relatively unique merits
application, combined with the lack of guidance by the Court, has created
some disparity among the circuits.
B. Circuit Court Analysis of Public Display Standing
Circuit courts have noted that injury-in-fact is “particularly elusive” in
Establishment Clause cases.239 When faced with these public display cases,
the circuits have adopted different standards by which to determine
sufficient injury-in-fact. Many of the circuits have tailored standing
doctrine in order to acknowledge the kind of injuries these plaintiffs are

233. Id. at 869. This is a rare example of a display case focusing on purpose, rather than
solely on effect. However the Court did reference endorsement test language, noting that
“[t]he reasonable observer could only think” that this was indeed the counties’ purpose. Cf.
infra note 238 and accompanying text.
234. ACLU of Ky. v. McCreary Cnty., 96 F. Supp. 2d 679, 682–83 (E.D. Ky. 2000).
235. Id. at 684.
236. Id. It is important to note that the Supreme Court quoted this language in its
recitation of the facts. McCreary, 545 U.S. at 852.
237. McCreary, 96 F. Supp. 2d at 682. This reasoning mirrors the current doctrine in the
Seventh Circuit. See infra Part II.B.3.
238. Compare Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573,
595 (1989) (“The effect of the display depends upon the message that the government’s
practice communicates: the question is ‘what viewers may fairly understand to be the
purpose of the display.’”), with Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 592 (1987) (invalidating
a Louisiana law requiring that creation science be taught in public schools, along with
evolution, because its “primary purpose” was specifically to advance a particular religion).
A rare example of a public display case being formally analyzed under the purpose prong is
McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky, 545 U.S. 844 (2005). However, this opinion also
utilized the endorsement test’s effect language. Id. at 869 (“The reasonable observer could
only think that the Counties meant to emphasize and celebrate the Commandments’ religious
message.”); see supra note 233.
239. Suhre v. Haywood Cnty., 131 F.3d 1083, 1085 (4th Cir. 1997) (quoting Murray v.
City of Austin, 947 F.2d 147, 151 (5th Cir. 1991)); see also Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111,
1120 (10th Cir. 2012); Saladin v. City of Milledgeville, 812 F.2d 687, 691 (11th Cir. 1987).
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likely to suffer.240 These injuries include, but are not limited to, feeling like
an “outsider” in the community as a result of the display.241
The Fourth Circuit,242 the Sixth Circuit,243 the Eighth Circuit,244 the
Ninth Circuit,245 and the Tenth Circuit246 have each expressly adopted a
“direct and unwelcome contact” standard to address this unique injury,
although, in application, these standards rely on various factors.247
Alternatively, the Seventh Circuit has implemented a more restrictive test,
requiring a showing of “altered behavior” to prove sufficiently concrete
injury.248 Other circuits have made use of this altered behavior test
although no other circuit has adopted it expressly.249
1. The “Direct and Unwelcome Contact” Standard
In adopting a “direct and unwelcome contact” standard, circuits rely on
the proposition that noneconomic and intangible injury may be sufficient to
240. See, e.g., Moss v. Spartanburg Cnty. Sch. Dist. Seven, 683 F.3d 599, 605 (4th Cir.
2012) (quoting Suhre, 131 F.3d at 1086), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 623 (2012); see also
Vasquez v. L.A. Cnty., 487 F.3d 1246, 1250 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he Establishment Clause is
primarily aimed at protecting non-economic interests of a spiritual, as opposed to a physical
or pecuniary, nature.”); ACLU of Ga. v. Rabun Cnty. Chamber of Commerce, Inc., 698 F.2d
1098, 1102 (11th Cir. 1983) (“In the context of an Establishment Clause claim, the
difficulties of applying principles of standing are enhanced by the reality that included
among the various motivations for pursuing such a claim are the spiritual, value-laden beliefs
of the plaintiffs.”).
241. Moss, 683 F.3d at 607; see also McCreary, 545 U.S. at 860 (“By showing a purpose
to favor religion, the government sends the . . . message to . . . nonadherents that they are
outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an accompanying message to
adherents that they are insiders, favored members . . . .” (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465
U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); supra
note 155 and accompanying text.
242. See Suhre, 131 F.3d at 1088 (holding that only direct contact is required because the
altered behavior standard is “contrived” and would only serve to further alienate plaintiffs);
see also Moss, 683 F.3d at 606 (requiring direct contact and relying on stigmatization, but
also looking to altered behavior, outside of the public display context).
243. See ACLU of Ohio Found., Inc. v. DeWeese, 633 F.3d 424 (6th Cir. 2011) (holding
that direct and unwelcome contact is sufficient).
244. See Red River Freethinkers v. City of Fargo, 679 F.3d 1015 (8th Cir. 2012).
245. See Vasquez, 487 F.3d at 1253 (“[S]piritual harm resulting from unwelcome direct
contact with an allegedly offensive religious (or antireligious) symbol is a legally cognizable
injury and suffices to confer Article III standing.”); see also Newdow v. Lefevre, 598 F.3d
638, 642 (9th Cir. 2010) (“That [the plaintiff’s] encounters with the [symbol] are common to
all Americans does not defeat his standing, because [the plaintiff] has alleged a concrete,
particularized, and personal injury resulting from his frequent, unwelcome contact with the
[the symbol].” (citing Vasquez, 487 F.3d at 1253)).
246. See Am. Atheists, Inc. v. Davenport, 637 F.3d 1095, 1113 (10th Cir. 2010) (holding
that “direct and unwelcome contact” is sufficient and that altered behavior is sufficient, but
not necessary).
247. See infra Part II.B.1.
248. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Zielke, 845 F.2d 1463, 1468 (7th Cir. 1988).
249. See, e.g., Cooper v. U.S. Postal Serv., 577 F.3d 479 (2d Cir. 2009) (finding altered
behavior, but not articulating whether feeling stigmatized would have been sufficient); see
also Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282, 1293 (11th Cir. 2003) (conferring standing based
on two plaintiffs who altered their behavior, but expressly not inquiring into the individual
standing of the named plaintiff who did not alter his behavior).
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make an Establishment Clause claim justiciable.250 In theory, this test
requires only direct and unwelcome contact with the challenged display. In
practice, however, the circuits discuss varying factors.
Most importantly, these circuits rely on direct contact with the alleged
symbol.251 To determine that a plaintiff has had sufficiently direct contact
with the alleged symbol, some courts have relied on the proximity of the
plaintiffs to the challenged conduct as a crucial consideration.252 Another
factor that courts have looked to is the location of the alleged symbol,
specifically whether it is located within or near a public facility.253 Yet
another factor employed is the extent of the allegedly direct and unwelcome
contact, requiring that the contact be “frequent and regular, not sporadic and
remote.”254
When applying the standard, the court must ensure that the injury is not a
mere generalized grievance.255 Often, the court will also distinguish the
Supreme Court’s language from Valley Forge that denied standing to
plaintiffs who “fail[ed] to identify any personal injury suffered by them as a
consequence of the alleged constitutional error, other than the psychological
consequence presumably produced by observation of conduct with which
one disagrees.”256 Although Valley Forge did not deal with any public
display,257 some circuits have distinguished the case, noting that the Valley
Forge plaintiffs were denied recovery as they had no personal contact with

250. Suhre v. Haywood Cnty., 131 F.3d 1083, 1085–86 (4th Cir. 1997) (citing Valley
Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464,
486 (1982)); Vasquez, 487 F.3d at 1250 (citing Suhre, 131 F.3d at 1085–86).
251. See ACLU-NJ v. Twp. of Wall, 246 F.3d 258 (3d Cir. 2001) (denying standing
because plaintiff had failed to establish direct contact, but not clarifying what would have
been sufficient); cf. Catholic League for Religious & Civil Rights v. San Francisco, 624 F.3d
1043, 1082 n.33 (9th Cir. 2010) (“The ‘contact’ that matters is [not eye contact, rather it is
contact] in the mind—[the] acquisition of the knowledge that the government endorses (or
condemns) a religion.”).
252. Suhre, 131 F.3d at 1087; see also Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for
Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 486–87 (1982) (noting that the plaintiffs
reside in states different from the location of the challenged conduct); Vasquez, 487 F.3d at
1251 (stating that the plaintiff had “held himself out as a member of the community where
the [symbol] [wa]s located.”).
253. Buono v. Norton, 371 F.3d 543, 547 (9th Cir. 2004) (The “inability to unreservedly
use public land suffices as injury-in-fact.”); Suhre, 131 F.3d at 1087 (noting that even if the
plaintiff continues to use the facility, his or her “use of the facility may be compromised by
repeated contact” with the alleged symbol).
254. Vasquez, 487 F.3d at 1250, 1252 (holding that “frequent regular contact with an
allegedly offensive religious symbol—or, in this case, an allegedly offensive anti-religious
symbol—can give rise to a legally cognizable injury”).
255. Suhre, 131 F.3d at 1089 (“[D]irect contact with the display sets a plaintiff apart from
the general public and shows that his grievance is not shared in substantially equal measure
by all or a large class of citizens.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).
256. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 485.
257. In fact, the Valley Forge opinion focused on reinterpreting the Flast exception and
dealt with the transfer of government property to a religious organization, without financial
payment. Id. at 468–69. See supra notes 169–74 for further discussion of the case.
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the alleged establishment of religion and, therefore, the harm was not
sufficiently particular to the plaintiffs.258
While acknowledging that a restrictive rule of standing may preclude
both meritorious and nonmeritorious claims alike,259 courts must still
balance this implication against the primary purposes behind the standing
doctrine.260 Particularly in these cases, the judiciary may not “transform[]
courtrooms into forums for the airing of abstract debates.”261 Even under
the direct and unwelcome contact test, a plaintiff’s contact with the symbol
may be “too tenuous, indirect, or abstract to give rise to Article III
standing.”262
Most of the circuits that have adopted the direct and unwelcome contact
test have indirectly relied on Supreme Court precedent in public display
cases that did not conduct a standing inquiry.263 For example, in Suhre v.
Haywood County,264 the Fourth Circuit reasoned that “[a]bsent Supreme
Court direction, we are unwilling to craft a rule of standing for religious
display cases that would effectively add ‘insult’ to the existing ‘injury’
requirement.”265 Furthermore, in response to the “altered behavior” test,266
the Suhre court noted that the Supreme Court had never required
Establishment Clause plaintiffs to take affirmative steps to avoid contact
with the challenged displays.267

258. Suhre, 131 F.3d at 1086; see also ACLU of Ohio Found., Inc. v. DeWeese, 633 F.3d
424, 429 n.1 (6th Cir. 2011) (“‘[W]e do not take the Supreme Court’s decision in [Valley
Forge] to stand for the proposition that psychological injury can never be a sufficient basis
for the conferral of Article III Standing.’” (citation omitted)); Buono, 371 F.3d at 547
(“Valley Forge nowhere suggests that plaintiffs lacked standing because their offense at the
property transfer was grounded in ideological, rather than religious, beliefs.”); Rohr, supra
note 22, at 529–30.
259. Suhre, 131 F.3d at 1091.
260. See supra Part I.A.1.
261. Suhre, 131 F.3d at 1091.
262. Vasquez, 487 F.3d at 1251 (finding that the plaintiff had “alleged more than ‘a mere
abstract objection’” (citation omitted)).
263. See Newdow v. Roberts, 603 F.3d 1002, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Kavanaugh, J.,
concurring) (finding it to be “extremely unlikely” that “the Supreme Court repeatedly
overlooked a major standing problem and decided a plethora of highly controversial and
divisive Establishment Clause cases unnecessarily and inappropriately”); Murray v. City of
Austin, 947 F.2d 147, 151 (5th Cir. 1991) (finding standing based on the plaintiff’s
allegations that the city’s use of a religious symbol offended him, relying heavily on “the
fact that standing has not been an issue in the Supreme Court in similar cases,” but not
articulating its own inquiry).
264. 131 F.3d 1083 (4th Cir. 1997).
265. Id. at 1088.
266. See infra Part II.B.3.
267. Id. Similarly, the Eighth Circuit noted that in Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677
(2005), “no [Supreme Court] Justice questioned Van Orden’s standing.” Red River
Freethinkers v. City of Fargo, 679 F.3d 1015, 1024 n.8 (8th Cir. 2012). However, the Eighth
Circuit did recognize that “‘[w]hen a potential jurisdictional defect is neither noted nor
discussed in a federal decision, the decision does not stand for the proposition that no defect
existed.’” Id.; cf. supra note 203 and accompanying text.
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2. The Eighth Circuit’s Particular Application of the
“Direct and Unwelcome Contact” Standard
The most recent decision to conduct a standing inquiry in a public
display case was the Eighth Circuit in Red River Freethinkers v. City of
Fargo.268 After conducting a detailed inquiry into the history of the
controversy, the Eighth Circuit expressly held that “direct, offensive, and
alienating contact” with the display was sufficient to satisfy injury-infact.269 At issue was a Ten Commandments monument, located on an open,
grassy area on property that belongs to Fargo, North Dakota (the City).270
The Fraternal Order of Eagles, a nonreligious civic organization donated the
monument to the city in 1958.271 The monument had sat, without legal
challenge, in its current location since 1961.272
In 2002, a group of Fargo residents, all of whom were members of the
Red River Freethinkers—a nonprofit corporation that promotes atheism and
agnosticism—sued the city in district court.273 Instead of filing an appeal
after their case was dismissed, the plaintiffs adopted a new strategy, and the
Freethinkers offered to donate its own monument to the city.274 The
Freethinkers also made it known to the City Attorney that if the city
removed the Ten Commandments to a private location, then the new
monument would no longer be necessary.275 The City Commission decided
to donate the monument to a private entity.276
As a result, a number of citizens circulated a petition.277 After receiving
the 5,265-signature petition, the Commission reversed its earlier decision to
268. 679 F.3d 1015 (8th Cir. 2012).
269. Id. at 1024.
270. Id. at 1017.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Twombly v. City of Fargo, 388 F. Supp. 2d 983, 986 (D.N.D. 2005). The Red River
Freethinkers association itself was not a named plaintiff in this action. After comparing
other “passive monument” cases, the Twombly court granted the city’s motion for summary
judgment and dismissed the case on the merits. Id. at 988–89 (conducting a “contextual
inquiry,” examining the “circumstances surrounding” the placement of the monument and
“‘the physical setting’” of the monument and concluding that the monument did not violate
the Establishment Clause (quoting Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 701 (2005) (Breyer, J.,
concurring))).
274. Red River, 679 F.3d at 1018. The proposed monument was to be inscribed with a
quote from the Treaty of Tripoli of 1797: “THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA IS NOT, IN ANY SENSE FOUNDED ON THE CHRISTIAN
RELIGION . . . . PRESENTED . . . IN RECOGNITION OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT OF EVERY
AMERICAN TO BELIEVE, OR NOT BELIEVE, IN ANY GOD.” Id. The Freethinkers requested that its
“sister monument” be placed near the Ten Commandments monument, in the hope that the
new monument would “downplay the Christian message” of the monument. Id.
275. Id. at 1018–19. The City Attorney advised the City Commission to decline the
Freethinkers’ donation and then to move the Ten Commandments monument to a private
location, as “‘the option with the least risk and greatest potential for cost-avoidance.’” Id. at
1019.
276. Id.
277. The petition proposed to add an ordinance to the municipal code which, if enacted,
would prevent “[a] marker or monument on City of Fargo property for 40 or more years”
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donate the monument to a private entity.278 A month later, the Commission
adopted a policy to no longer accept any additional monuments to be placed
on the site.279
As a result, the Freethinkers filed a lawsuit on behalf of its members.280
The Freethinkers now alleged that the adoption of the ordinance and the
refusal to accept the “sister monument” by the Commission violated the
Establishment Clause.281 The district court held that the Freethinkers
lacked standing and dismissed the complaint.282 The Eighth Circuit
reversed the district court’s dismissal, finding that the Freethinkers had
standing to bring suit.283
The Red River circuit court expressly held that “direct, offensive, and
alienating contact” with the display was sufficient injury to confer
standing.284 Citing Lujan,285 the court found the Freethinkers’ injuries to be
“actual and imminent,” “personal” to its members, and “concrete.”286 The
Eighth Circuit concluded that there was “no doubt” that these injuries were
sufficient.287 The court emphasized that the city had displayed the
monument for fifty years, “with no end in sight,” and that this left the
members—who lived in and around the city288—to “feel isolated and
unwelcome.”289 While acknowledging that these injuries were “largely
emotional,” the Court reasoned that “[t]o the extent that emotional harms
differ from other, more readily quantifiable harms, that difference lacks

from being removed from its current location. Id. The Ten Commandments monument was
the only monument to which this proposed ordinance would apply. Id. at 1019 n.2.
278. Id. at 1019–20. Later that month, the Commission unanimously adopted the
proposed ordinance. Id. at 1020.
279. Id. Other circuits have decided cases with similar fact patterns. For example, in
ACLU of Ohio Foundation, Inc. v. DeWeese, 633 F.3d 424 (6th Cir. 2011), the Sixth Circuit
heard a public display case concerning a framed text containing the Ten Commandments in a
courtroom. In DeWeese, the courtroom had previously been ordered by the Sixth Circuit to
remove a framed text of the Ten Commandments as a violation of the Establishment Clause.
Id. at 426. Plaintiffs again brought suit to remove this different version. Id.
280. Red River Freethinkers v. City of Fargo, 749 F. Supp. 2d 940 (D.N.D. 2010), rev’d
and remanded, 679 F.3d 1015 (8th Cir. 2012).
281. Id. at 945.
282. Id. at 942. The magistrate’s report found that the original suit filed by the individual
members (Twombly) had preclusive effect and that the Freethinker’s allegations were
conclusory. Id. at 946, 949–50.
283. First, the court cited to its prior decision in ACLU Nebraska Foundation v. City of
Plattsmouth, 358 F.3d 1020, 1029 (8th Cir. 2004), which acknowledged the circuit split
concerning requisite injury in “passive monument” cases. Red River, 679 F.3d at 1023
(comparing a “more demanding test” with “the prevailing view requir[ing] only direct and
unwelcome personal contact with the alleged establishment of religion”). Because the
plaintiffs in City of Plattsmouth had satisfied the “more demanding test” that was required in
some circuits, the court did not need to expressly adopt either test. Id. at 1023.
284. Id. at 1024.
285. See supra notes 127–37 and accompanying text for discussion of the Lujan case.
286. Red River, 679 F.3d at 1023–24.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 1024.
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expression in Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement.”290
In
completing its standing inquiry, the Eighth Circuit found that the alleged
injuries were a “direct consequence of the city’s allegedly unlawful
conduct”291 and that there was “no doubt . . . that removal of the monument
from public property would remedy the alleged injury.”292
In so holding, the court noted, “it is plausible that a government might,
by subsequent action, transform a formerly permissible display into an
impermissible one.”293 On the other hand, the Eighth Circuit also
recognized that “a government might possibly avoid an Establishment
Clause violation by encouraging observers to consider a monument’s
‘secular message’ or ‘context [in] history.’”294 Having concluded that the
Freethinkers had standing to bring suit, the court then remanded the case to
be litigated on the merits.295 Thus, the Eighth Circuit’s analysis focused
solely on the issue of standing.296
3. The “Altered Behavior” Standard
In contrast to the direct and unwelcome contact standard, the Seventh
Circuit, in Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. v. Zielke,297 held that a
showing of “altered behavior” was necessary to establish injury and confer
The Zielke challenge concerned a Ten
Article III standing.298
Commandments monument displayed in a park owned by the City of La
Crosse, Wisconsin.299 A La Crosse resident—a named plaintiff—and a
290. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1).
291. Id. In this causation analysis, the court rejected the magistrate’s finding that the
allegations were conclusory. Id. at 1025 (“The Supreme Court has never held that a plaintiff
must plead and prove a religious motivation on the part of the government as a necessary
element of an Establishment Clause claim.”).
292. Id. at 1026. Here, the court again rejected the magistrate’s reasoning and found that
the removal of the monument was not precluded by the earlier Twombly decision as the
city’s post-Twombly actions gave rise to an entirely new issue: “[w]hether the City’s actions
post-Twombly transformed the Ten Commandments monument from a permissible display
into an impermissible violation of the Establishment Clause.” Id. This type of inquiry into
the history of the monument is similar to the purpose holding in McCreary. See supra note
233.
293. Red River, 679 F.3d at 1027 (citing Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460
(2009)).
294. Id. (citing Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 701–02 (2005) (Breyer, J.,
concurring)).
295. Id. at 1028.
296. See id.; see also id. at 1023 (“The standing inquiry is not . . . an assessment of the
merits of a plaintiff’s claim.”).
297. 845 F.2d 1463 (7th Cir. 1988).
298. Id. at 1467; cf. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351–52 (1996) (holding that, in order
to establish relevant actual injury as a result of inability to receive adequate legal assistance,
an inmate must also demonstrate that this actually “hindered his efforts to pursue a legal
claim”).
299. Zielke, 845 F.2d at 1465–66. Notably, the monument was donated by the Fraternal
Order of Eagles, as was the monument in Red River. Id. at 1465 n.1 (noting that the group
“was engaged in a national project of donating similar monuments of the Ten
Commandments to cities and towns across the United States”).
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group called the Freedom from Religion Foundation complained to the La
Crosse Common Council but, after a public hearing, the city decided to not
take any action concerning the monument.300 The plaintiffs then brought
suit, but the district court dismissed the case on the ground that the
plaintiffs lacked standing.301
Upholding this dismissal, the Seventh Circuit cited Valley Forge,302 and
reasoned that “[t]he psychological harm that results from witnessing
conduct with which one disagrees” was not sufficient injury.303 The circuit
court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that “the display is a rebuke to their
religious beliefs and that they are offended by its presence,” and precluded
a grant of standing as the plaintiffs had not altered their behavior as a result
of the monument.304 The court also rejected other arguments for standing,
including the evidence of the “severity” of injury as shown through the
complaints to the La Crosse Common Council,305 the fact that a named
plaintiff’s home was located in proximity to the park,306 and a municipal
taxpayer claim.307
While Zielke is still good law,308 the Seventh Circuit has softened this
altered behavior requirement by creating an exception that allows plaintiffs
to establish standing without a showing of altered behavior when the
unwelcome contact occurs while performing a civic duty or fulfilling a legal
obligation.309 However, the circuit maintains that “hurt feelings differ from
legal injury” and that “[t]he ‘value interests of concerned bystanders’ do not
support standing to sue.”310 As noted previously, other circuits have also
made use of the altered behavior test, although no other circuit has
300. Id. at 1466.
301. Id.
302. See supra notes 169–74 and accompanying text for a discussion of the case.
303. Zielke, 845 F.2d at 1467. This interpretation of Valley Forge has also been relied on
in scholarship advocating for a more restrictive test. See supra notes 22 and 172.
304. Zielke, 845 F.2d at 1467–68. But cf. Suhre v. Haywood Cnty., 131 F.3d 1083, 1088–
89 (4th Cir. 1997) (asserting that the altered behavior standard is “contrived,” would only
serve to further alienate plaintiffs, and could trigger mootness doctrine application).
305. Zielke, 845 F.2d at 1468 n.3.
306. Id. at 1468–69. The circuit found that although the named plaintiff lived in La
Crosse, she had failed to prove how close she lived to the park and whether the monument
was visible during her normal routine. Id.
307. Id. at 1469–70.
308. See, e.g., Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Obama, 641 F.3d 803, 807 (7th Cir.
2011) (citing Zielke favorably); Gonzales v. N. Twp. of Lake Cnty., 4 F.3d 1412, 1416 (7th
Cir. 1993) (conferring standing based on altered behavior); cf. Harris v. City of Zion, 927
F.2d 1401, 1405 (7th Cir. 1991) (conferring standing because plaintiff “mightily strives to
avoid any visual contact” with the display).
309. See Books v. Elkhart Cnty., 401 F.3d 857, 861 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that “direct
and unwelcome contact” is sufficient injury when contact occurs while attempting to
“participate fully as [a] citizen[ ]” (citing Doe v. Cnty. of Montgomery, 41 F.3d 1156, 1159
(7th Cir. 1994))).
310. Freedom from Religion, 641 F.3d at 807 (quoting United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S.
669, 687 (1973)). Chief Judge Frank H. Easterbrook has been a particularly strong supporter
of this viewpoint. See, e.g., Books, 401 F.3d at 870 (Easterbrook, C.J., dissenting) (alleging
“dismay at seeing the Ten Commandments” is not a concrete injury, “otherwise there would
be universal standing: anyone could contest any public policy or action he disliked.”).
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expressly adopted a showing of altered behavior as a necessary prerequisite
to standing.311
III. RESOLUTION
The “spiritual stake”312 asserted under the Establishment Clause creates a
unique problem for general standing jurisprudence. This Note argues that
challenges to the public display of religious symbols require a specifically
tailored interpretation of injury-in-fact to ensure that meritorious claims
have access to the federal court system. In Part III.A.1, this Note argues
that the Supreme Court has recognized that traditional standing doctrine is
not applicable to Establishment Clause claims. In Part III.A.2, this Note
then identifies the endorsement test as the source of the conflict that
prevents the courts from applying general standing doctrine. Part III.B then
analyzes the relevance of history in a public display standing inquiry.
Finally, Part III.C articulates an injury-in-fact standard for specific use in
public display cases.
A. Resolving Supreme Court Precedent on Standing and
the Establishment Clause
The Supreme Court has long acknowledged access to the federal court
system as a fundamental right.313 However, the standing doctrine acts as a
gatekeeper, restricting access and limiting the jurisdiction of the federal
judiciary.314 This doctrine serves an important role, performing both
theoretical315 and practical316 functions. However, while separation of
powers concerns and the debate over the proper role of the federal judiciary
pervade any discussion of standing,317 these issues are not the primary
concern in this particular context. There is usually negligible, if any,
concrete government action in these cases. Rather, the endorsement test
conceptualized the harm as one of perception. Therefore, these challenges
do not generally take the form of judicial review of government action.
Instead, the challenge is a direct charge to the court to fulfill its primary
role: interpreting the Constitution.318
Under this particular framework, the main function of standing in these
cases is to ensure that the challenger is a “proper plaintiff.”319 This Note
argues that the Supreme Court has implicitly recognized that the
endorsement test requires a specific interpretation of injury-in-fact in order
to determine a proper plaintiff. Furthermore, this interpretation, while
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.

See supra note 249 and accompanying text.
See supra note 145 and accompanying text. See generally Part I.B.1.
See supra notes 24, 137 and accompanying text.
See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying note 41.
See supra notes 38–42 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying note 178.
See supra text accompanying notes 38, 41; cf. supra text accompanying note 92.
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unique, is fully reconcilable with the Court’s general standing
jurisprudence.
1. General Standing Doctrine Is Inapplicable to
Establishment Clause Plaintiffs
The Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence reflects an
understanding that these challenges require a specific injury-in-fact
standard. This was initially reflected by the creation of the Flast exception
to federal taxpayer standing.320 The Flast exception was created out of
necessity, as “[s]ometimes, no one other than taxpayers has suffered the
injury necessary to challenge government sponsorship of religion.”321
However, the Court has since stripped the exception of most of its practical
function.322 This narrow reinterpretation of Flast is often cited as evidence
of a general trend toward a more restrictive interpretation of Article III
standing, particularly within the Establishment Clause context.323
Despite these restrictions, the Court has continued to hear public display
challenges.324 By reaching the merits, the Court has validated that the
Constitution protects spiritual interests. However, the Court has passed, sub
silentio, on the standing issue in each case.325 As many lower courts have
acknowledged,326 this reflects an implicit understanding—even if it is not
binding precedent327—that general standing doctrine cannot be applied
when evaluating this specific type of injury-in-fact.328
2. Reconciling the Endorsement Test with
Prevailing Standing Jurisprudence
When the Court recognizes a new cognizable interest, it necessarily
evaluates the sufficiency of the harm to the asserted interest in light of the
purpose behind the source of the protection.329 For example, the Akins
Court appeared to conflate the importance of the right at stake—the right to
vote—with the determination of whether there is sufficient injury.330 While
Article III standing is a separate and distinct inquiry from a finding on the
merits,331 the endorsement test332 is, in part, predicated on the impact and

320. See supra notes 159, 161–67 and accompanying text.
321. See supra note 177.
322. See supra notes 168–70 and accompanying text.
323. See supra notes 22, 66, 98, 138–42 and accompanying text. See infra Part III.A.2
for analysis of the implications associated with this arguable trend.
324. See supra Part II.A; cf. supra note 201 and accompanying text.
325. See supra Part II.A.
326. See supra notes 230, 263–67 and accompanying text.
327. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
328. Cf. supra note 201 and accompanying text.
329. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
330. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
331. See supra notes 58–60 and accompanying text.
332. See generally supra Part I.B.2.
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extent of psychological harm caused by feeling stigmatized by one’s own
government.333
This spiritual harm, unlike other types of cognizable noneconomic
injuries,334 is inherently subjective and difficult to define objectively. This
harm is unquantifiable, unlike a property-based harm, and not visible,
unlike a physical harm.335 However, standing doctrine does not limit
access to the federal courts to those plaintiffs seeking to remedy easily
identifiable harms.336 The many noneconomic interests that the Court has
explicitly deemed constitutionally cognizable337 evidence a broad
understanding of the general nature of harm. Most importantly, the Court
has expressly recognized stigmatic harm.338 Cognizable injuries also
include harm to an individual’s recreational activities or aesthetic taste.339
Furthermore, the requirements of injury-in-fact, particularly the
requirement of particularized and personal injury, are nuanced and
complex. For instance, the Court has held that a widely shared harm is not
per se insufficient.340 The Court has also gone so far as to recognize
personal injury where a particular harm is shared by an entire district341 or
neighborhood.342
However, the Valley Forge court expressly stated that “the psychological
consequence presumably produced by observation of conduct with which
one disagrees” alone is insufficient to confer standing.343 Courts and
scholars alike have used this language to suggest that the subjective
“consequence” produced by the perception of government endorsement is
an insufficient injury.344 However, this interpretation misapplies the case
law. First, Valley Forge was not a public symbol case. Instead, the Court
was rejecting the negligible interest in the disputed taxpayer dollars as
insufficient to confer standing.
Second, this application further
misinterprets the nature of the specific harm evaluated under the
endorsement test. The harm is not predicated solely on the fact that the
challenger was offended. Rather, the harm is caused by the perceived
source of this “psychological consequence”: the government.345
The Court’s noneconomic standing precedent has required objectively
verifiable showings of harm. The Lujan court’s denial of standing—
partially grounded on the fact that the plaintiff had failed to adequately
show when she would personally and directly suffer the alleged harm—best
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.

Cf. supra text accompanying note 57. See generally supra Part I.B.2.
See generally supra Part I.A.3.
Cf. supra notes 61–62 and accompanying text.
Cf. supra text accompanying note 63.
See supra Part I.A.3.
See supra notes 74–77 and accompanying text.
See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying note 171.
See supra notes 22, 172, 303 and accompanying text; cf. supra note 310.
See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
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illustrates this interpretation.346 The Lujan decision is frequently cited as
support for the trend toward more restrictive standing.347
However, spiritual harm is internal, rather than external, and is therefore
fundamentally different from the environmental harm asserted in Lujan.
The Lujan plaintiff alleged personal harm arising from the inability to
observe the affected wildlife.348 Thus, if the wildlife was indeed affected—
an objectively verifiable fact—and the plaintiff could show that she was
personally prevented from observing this wildlife, she may have proven a
sufficiently particularized injury-in-fact.349
The endorsement test, on the other hand, conceptualizes the harm in
terms of perception. The harm does not arise from the display itself, but
from the perceived governmental endorsement of the religion. It follows
that the existence of the display alone, unlike the affected wildlife, is
insufficient to help verify the personal harm. The externality—the
display—is merely the means of endorsement, rather than the direct source
of the harm. In fact, Justice O’Connor expressly noted that the court must
consider both “the subjective and the objective components of the message”
when applying the endorsement test.350 As conceptualized, the harm is
verifiable only through the plaintiff’s own testimony: When I look at the
challenged display, I perceive that the government has relegated me, a
nonadherent, to an inferior political status as a second-class citizen.
B. Policy Implications: Red River and the Relevance of History
This Note argues that the history of the display is relevant to the court’s
injury-in-fact analysis and incorporates the Eighth Circuit’s recent holding
in its proposed test. In Red River, the Eighth Circuit’s standing ruling
included an exhaustive analysis of the history surrounding the controversy
and the effect this history had on the total injury suffered by the
plaintiffs.351 While adopting the direct and unwelcome contact standard
that had been previously adopted by various sister circuits, the Eighth
Circuit paid particular attention to this history, not in a merits
determination, but in its standing inquiry.352 The Court did not limit its
evaluation of injury-in-fact to the “psychological consequence” that resulted
from the challenger’s direct and unwelcome contact with the display itself.
Rather, the Court also incorporated the harm suffered due to the actions of
the Commission.353
This approach is in line with the Supreme Court’s precedent and Justice
O’Connor’s articulation of the endorsement test. The Court has repeatedly
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.

See supra notes 129–30 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 98, 138–42 and accompanying text.
See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
Cf. supra notes 129–32 and accompanying text.
See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
See generally supra Part II.B.2.
See supra notes 293–96 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 278–79, 293 and accompanying text.
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conducted a “contextual inquiry” in its merits determination for public
display challenges, whether or not under the express framework of the
endorsement test.354 Furthermore, Justice O’Connor articulated that “the
‘history and ubiquity’ of a practice is relevant” to the determination of
whether the “reasonable observer” would perceive the display as a
governmental endorsement of religion.355 Although Justice Stevens
disagreed,356 Justice O’Connor appeared to conceptualize the observation
not as a snapshot viewed by a reasonable and impartial third party but as an
observation of a reasonable observer in the position to interpret the display
with multiple sources of information and impressions.357
The challengers in Red River attempted, and failed, to compromise with
the local government.358 Each of the events that followed the original
litigation—including the petition,359 the adoption of the new protective
ordinance,360 and the policy precluding new donations361—added to the
magnitude of the injury suffered by the members. By considering only
generally recognized forms of injury, plaintiffs with true injuries and
potentially meritorious challenges may be left with no available recourse.
C. A New Test for Standing in Public Display Challenges
This Note advocates for a multifactor test that embraces most of the
circuit decisions, while also ensuring that Article III standing remains a
meaningful threshold inquiry required to gain access to the federal court
system. Under the proposed test, direct and unwelcome contact will
presumably be a necessary prerequisite to standing, as it is required to show
particularized and specific injury. However, this requirement may be
waived in the event a challenger has not come into direct contact with the
display because he or she actively avoided such contact. In this case, the
imminence of the injury should be subject to heightened scrutiny and the
challenger must sufficiently prove active avoidance.362
The other factors, which are to be considered in relation to one another,
include membership in the affected community, the frequency of contact
with the display (or the frequency of active avoidance of the display), and
the location and reputation of the display. Additionally, this Note
specifically endorses the Eighth Circuit’s analysis under the direct and
unwelcome contact standard and advocates that an inquiry into the history
of the specific monument is relevant, and sometimes necessary, to
determine injury-in-fact.
354. See supra notes 179, 194–95, 273 and accompanying text; cf. supra note 182 and
accompanying text.
355. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
356. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
357. Cf. supra note 185 and accompanying text.
358. See supra Part II.B.2.
359. See supra note 277 and accompanying text.
360. See supra note 278 and accompanying text.
361. See supra note 279 and accompanying text.
362. Cf. supra notes 133–34 and accompanying text.
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When the challenger is a member of the community, it is likely that there
will be a sufficient showing of injury. A reasonable community member
would very likely have specific knowledge of the display, including its
origination and any role the local government may have played in its
maintenance. This maintenance extends beyond financial contributions. It
may also include instances where the government chose not to act on
previous objections or failed to allow other displays to be included.363
Community members would include not only residents but also those with a
strong connection to and knowledge of the community, such as those who
come into contact with the display in the regular course of employment and
personal activities. When dealing with relatively small communities, the
history surrounding the controversy and the purpose behind the challenged
government action are relevant to the injury, as these can intensify the harm
associated with feeling relegated to second-class citizenship. In a small
community, this background information would likely be known to the
“reasonable observer”364 and would affect the magnitude of this observer’s
spiritual reaction.
The effect of the “direct and unwelcome contact” by a community
member would differ significantly from the one-time contact by a casual
observer. A nonmember will often have no specific knowledge of the
history of the display. However, “frequent and regular, [rather than]
sporadic and remote,” contact,365 even without specific knowledge, may be
sufficient when combined with the presence of other factors.
It will be more difficult for an individual who has no real connection to
the community and does not frequently come into contact with the display
to allege injury other than “the psychological consequence presumably
produced by observation of conduct with which one disagrees.”366
Additional factors that may compensate for this lack of connection with the
community and infrequent contact with the display may include the
reputation and the physical location of the display. A particularly wellknown display may cause a more significant injury to a one-time observer
than he or she would suffer from multiple observations of a lesser-known
display.367 Similarly, the injury suffered from the one-time contact with a
display located inside a government building could be greater than multiple
contacts with a display that, while technically on public land, is located in
front of a row of private businesses.
Although not an absolute bar to standing, an injury resulting from a
single contact should be subject to a higher burden of proof. A single
contact, like the purchase of an airline ticket,368 can be too easily satisfied,
thus rendering the important standing inquiry meaningless. On the other
363.
364.
365.
366.
367.
368.

Cf. supra Part II.B.2.
See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
See supra note 254 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 171–72 and accompanying text.
See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 131, 138 and accompanying text.
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hand, a showing of altered behavior may be relevant, but it is not required
as it is arbitrary and similarly manipulable. A showing of altered behavior,
however, may allow standing in a case where the challenger has not come
into direct contact with the display as he or she actively avoided such
contact.
As the law stands, the Supreme Court evaluates a challenged display in
light of the contextual circumstances.369 In order for meritorious claimants
to access the federal courts, the threshold inquiry into the challenger’s
injury must take into account the various sources of harm that are
recognized in this merits determination. This seemingly liberal application
of injury-in-fact to public display cases, however, does not conflate the
standing inquiry with a merits determination, nor does it strip the doctrine
of its important function.
While a challenger may have indeed suffered an acute injury due to his or
her personal perception of endorsement, the court may still uphold the
display. The endorsement test does not hinge on one challenger’s injury but
on the perception of the “reasonable observer” in light of the relevant
circumstances. For example, despite its comprehensive standing ruling, the
Eighth Circuit remanded the Red River case to the district court for a
determination on the merits.370
Besides being distinct from the merits, this specific standard is also
supported by the Court’s prevailing standing jurisprudence and furthers the
purposes behind the standing doctrine. This standard ensures that the
challenger has a sufficient “spiritual stake” in the controversy without
closing the doors to the federal court system.
CONCLUSION
So long as the endorsement test remains the prevailing merits standard
applied in public display cases, a more flexible definition of injury-infact—crafted specifically for these cases—is necessary in order to further
both the purposes behind the standing doctrine and the interests protected
under the Establishment Clause. This Note advocates a version of the direct
and unwelcome contact standard, similar to that employed by the Eighth
Circuit in Red River.
This flexible standard would not require the plaintiffs in American
Atheists, Inc. v. Port Authority of New York & New Jersey371—the case
alluded to in the introduction—to live or work in lower Manhattan, or to
either frequent the 9/11 Memorial on a regular basis or avoid it altogether to
prove altered behavior. Instead, an individual whose knowledge of the
cross’s history precluded a desire to visit the 9/11 Memorial would have
standing to seek redress for this particularized and imminent injury. While
it is outside the scope of this Note to predict the eventual resolution of this
369. See supra notes 179, 194–95, 273 and accompanying text.
370. See supra notes 295–96 and accompanying text.
371. No. 11 Civ 6026 (S.D.N.Y. dismissed Mar. 28, 2013).
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case, the judiciary first needs jurisdiction to evaluate and define this
pervasive constitutional issue.

